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Abstract
One of the most prominent and consistent findings of the recent empirical literature
on fiscal policy is that investment expenditure is crowded-out by public spending in the
short-run. In this contribution, we address this empirical fact using a dynamic general
equilibrium model and show that the introduction of a habit-forming behavior plays a
major role in accommodating the observed negative relationship between investment and
government expenditure. Our numerical experiments point out the role of consumption
inertia in determining the reactions of the open economy: as habit persistence gets
stronger, a fiscal expansion crowds-out real consumption by a smaller amount and
investment by a larger one, while the current account enters into a greater deficit.
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent and consistent findings of the empirical literature related to the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks is that investment expenditure is crowded-out by public
spending in the short-run (see e. g. Blanchard and Perotti [2002], Mountford and Uhlig [2005],
Perotti [2005], Afonso and Sousa [2009]). However, the theoretical explanation of this empirical
fact remains unsatisfactory. While standard Keynesian theory would predict that crowding-out
occurs through increases in interest rates, Mountford and Uhlig [2005] find that empirically
“government spending shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential investment with-
out causing interest rates to rise”. Similarly, although the neo-classical Real Business Cycle
literature has the advantage of being based on sound theoretical foundations, as exemplified
by Baxter and King [1993], its predictions are also at odds with empirical facts as we shall
discuss below. In this paper, in contrast, we are able to provide a theoretical explanation of the
crowding-out of investment by relaxing the assumption of time separability in utility within a
Baxter and King type framework.
Open economy versions of Baxter and King’s [1993] model considering standard prefer-
ences find that consumption reacts strongly to a fiscal shock, investment is crowded-in, and
the current account enters in deficit due to capital accumulation (see e. g. , Karayalc¸in [1999]).
These conclusions come as a result of the assumption of time separable preferences implying
that the representative household chooses a perfect smoothing temporal path for real expen-
diture. Thus, after a balanced-budget fiscal expansion, consumption overreacts to the fall in
real disposable income which in turn releases enough resources for capital accumulation. Since
saving behavior plays a minor role, the investment boom drives the current account into deficit.
However, recent empirical results cast doubt over these three conclusions. First, according to
estimates documented by Perotti [2005], Afonso and Sousa [2009], a fiscal shock crowds-out
investment instead of boosting capital accumulation. Second, empirical evidence provided by
Mountford and Uhlig [2005], and corroborated by Afonso and Sousa [2009], reveals that pri-
vate consumption does not change significantly after a fiscal expansion. This finding suggests
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that consumption weakly reacts in the short-run, and thereby that the marginal propensity
to consume displays a small value. Third, estimates by Chinn and Prasad [2003] show that
an increase in fiscal deficit leads to a higher current account deficit in both developing and
industrialized countries. More specifically, empirical evidence documented by Freund [2005]
reveals that short-run current account deficits episodes are more associated with a decline in
savings than with an increase in investment.
Here we show that the introduction of a habit index into the utility function helps to improve
the predictive power of the Baxter and King [1993] model by modifying the chain of events
following a fiscal expansion. More precisely, higher fiscal spending financed by lump-sum taxes
reduces private wealth and induces agents to cut their real expenditure. However, since agents
wish to sustain their original standard of living, consumption reacts smoothly and savings fall.
At the same time, consumption inertia implies that the reduction in private demand is not large
enough to offset additional public spending such that investment is crowded-out. Whatever
the degree of habit persistence, the drop in savings always more than offsets the decline in
investment and thereby the open country experiences an initial current account deficit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a novel two-
good open economy model with habit formation. The macroeconomic equilibrium is analyzed
in section 3. Section 4 discusses the effects of a permanent fiscal expansion and provides
a sensitivity analysis which highlights the quantitative role of habit persistence. Section 5
concludes.
2 An Open Economy Model with Habit Formation
We consider a semi-small open economy that is populated by a large number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is assumed to
be semi-small in the sense that it is price-taker in international capital markets (i. e. , the world
interest rate r? is exogenous) but is large enough on world good markets to influence the price
of its export goods.
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2.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes domestic and foreign goods denoted by
cD and cF , respectively, which are aggregated by means of a CES function:
c =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cD
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cF )φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
where ϕ is the weight of the domestic good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1)
and φ corresponds to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
consumption goods. In line with Carroll, Overland and Weil [2000], agents care about both
current and past real consumption, denoted by c and s respectively, in deriving utility. The
representative household maximizes the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− ²
[
c
(s)γ
]1−²
e−βtdt,=
∫ ∞
0
1
1− ²
[
(c)1−γ
(c
s
)γ]1−²
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, ² > 0 corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, and γ > 0 stands for the weight attached to habits in utility. According to (2), agents
derive utility from a geometric weighted average of absolute and relative consumption where
γ is the weight of relative consumption. If γ = 0, the comparison of real consumption to the
reference stock turns out to be irrelevant and the case of time separability in preferences is
obtained. If γ > 0, then agents care about their relative consumption in deriving utility which
influences their consumption choices. They take into account that for a given change in their
current consumption, the consecutive adjustment of habits influences the marginal utility of
future consumption which modifies the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and thereby
the allocation of real expenditure.
The habit stock denoted by s(t) is defined as a distributed lag on past real consumption:
s(t) = σ
∫ t
−∞
c (τ) e−σ(t−τ)dτ, (3)
where the parameter σ indexes the relative weight of recent consumption in determining the
reference stock s. Differentiating equation (3) w. r. t. time gives the law of motion of habit
stock:
s˙(t) = σ [c(t)− s(t)] . (4)
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Intuitively, the larger is σ, the greater is the weight of consumption in the recent past in
determining the stock of habits, and the faster the reference stock adjusts to current expendi-
ture. By noting that habits coincide with real consumption in the long run, setting c = s into
the iso-elastic function (2) leads to a long-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
denoted by ν = 1[γ+²(1−γ)] . Since the long-term IES under time non separable preferences is
higher than the standard IES 1/² as long as the ² > 1, the steady-state change of consumption
is magnified.1
Households supply inelastically one unit of labor services and hold physical capital stock
for which they receive wage rate w(t) and the capital rental rate respectively. In addition, they
accumulate internationally traded bonds holding, b(t), that yields net interest rate earnings
r?b(t), expressed in terms of the foreign good. Denoting lump-sum taxes by T and the con-
sumption price index by pc, the flow budget constraint is equal to households’ real disposable
income less absorption:
b˙(t) =
1
p(t)
{
r?p(t)b(t) +
(
rK(t) + δK
)
k(t) + w(t)− T − pcc(t)− I(t)
}
, (5)
where gross investment I is given by:
I(t) = k˙(t) + δKk(t). (6)
where δK ≥ 0 is a fixed depreciation rate.
Since c (.) is homothetic, the household’s maximization problem can be decomposed into two
stages. In the first stage, the representative household chooses the optimal levels of consumption
as well as investment in physical capital and foreign bonds. The cost-minimizing allocation of
real expenditure between domestic goods and imports can be decided at the second stage which
yields: cD = (1− αc) pcc and pcF = αcpcc, with αc the share of foreign goods in consumption
expenditure.
2.2 Firms
A large number of identical and perfectly competitive firms produce a final good which can
be consumed domestically, invested, or exported. They use physical capital k and labor n,
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according to a constant returns to scale production function, Y = F (k, n), which is assumed
to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal products. Profit
maximization gives the standard first order conditions according to which capital marginal
product is equal to the capital rental rate, i. e. , Fk = rK + δK , and labor marginal product is
equal to the the wage rate, i. e. , Fn = w.2
2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government who finances public spending on the domestic
good gD and imports gF by raising lump-sum taxes T in accordance with the balanced budget
condition: gD + pgF = T .
3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
First-Order Conditions
Denoting by λ and ξ the shadow prices of wealth and habits, the macroeconomic equilibrium
is defined by the following set of equations:
c−²s−γ(1−²) + σξ = pc (p)λ/p, (7a)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (7b)
ξ˙ = (β + σ) ξ + γc1−²s−[γ(1−²)+1], (7c)
p˙ = p
(
rK − r?) , with rK = Fk − δK , (7d)
and dynamic equations (4), (5), (6), and appropriate transversality conditions. In order to
generate an interior solution, we require that β = r?. This standard assumption made in the
literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when
individuals receive new information and must remain constant over time from thereon.
The dynamic efficiency condition (7d) asserts that the real exchange rate adjusts so as to
equalize the rate of return on domestic physical capital net of capital depreciation, i. e. , rK , to
the real rate of return on traded bonds, i. e. , r? + p˙/p. The real exchange rate dynamics
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influence in turn the consumption temporal path by affecting the consumption-based real
interest rate. The law of motion for real consumption can be expressed in an interpretable
form by using static and dynamic optimality conditions (7a) and (7c). Differentiating (7a)
with respect to time, eliminating the shadow value of habits ξ(t) and substituting (7c), we
obtain the dynamic equation for c:
c˙
c
=
1
²
[
1 + σξc²sγ(1−²)
] [
r? + (1− αc) p˙
p
− ρ (c, s, p)
]
. (8)
Equation (8) restates the consumption Euler equation, which relates the optimal profile of
consumption to the difference between the consumption-based real interest rate, rc = r? +
(1− αc) p˙p , and the rate of time preference, denoted by ρ(t), which is variable over time.
Denoting exports by X, we impose a domestic good market clearing condition to fully
describe the macroeconomic equilibrium:3
F (k) = cD +X (p) + I + gD, (9)
where investment adjusts to equalize supply and aggregate demand along the transitional path.
Steady-State
The steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting c˙, s˙, k˙, p˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the
following set of equations:4
c˜ =
[(
β + σ
β + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]− 1
γ+²(1−γ)
, (10a)
F
(
k˜
)
= c˜D +X (p˜) + gD + δK k˜, (10b)
r?b˜+X (p˜) /p˜− c˜F − gF = 0, (10c)(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+Φ2 (s˜− s0) , (10d)
where the stock of habits s˜ must coincide with real consumption once the economy reaches
the steady-state. Equation (10b) restates that the production of domestic goods must be
exactly outweighed by a demand counterpart. Equation (10c) implies that in the steady-state
equilibrium, net foreign interest receipts from traded bonds holding must be exactly matched
by net exports. Finally, equation (10d) represents the linearized version of the intertermporal
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solvency constraint of the open economy according to which the net foreign asset position is
determined by both investment and consumption decisions.5
Equation (10a) determines the long-run level of real consumption. Whenever the relative
weight attributed to habit stock γ is positive, the long-run rate of change of c is influenced by
the long-term IES with time non separable preferences ν, which is higher than the inverse of
relative risk aversion 1/². Hence, after a reduction of private wealth, habit-forming consumers
experience a larger steady-state fall in consumption than a household displaying standard
preferences. More precisely, the closer to unity γ is, the larger is ν and the greater is the
long-run decrease in c for a given reduction in private wealth. The explanation is that as γ gets
closer to unity, households cut their real expenditure by a smaller amount in the short-run.
This behavior has a counterpart: they must reduce their real consumption by a greater amount
in the long-run as they decumulate financial wealth over the transition. Finally, a greater trade
openness softens the drop of real consumption by moderating the decrease in private wealth
measured in terms of the domestic good.
4 Fiscal Expansion and Adjustment of the Open Economy
In this section, we investigate the steady-state and dynamic effects of a permanent increase in
government spending on the domestic good gD.
4.1 Benchmark Parametrization
We briefly discuss the calibration by starting first with the parameters that are kept fixed
throughout the simulations. The parameter φ is set to 1.5. The parameter ϕ is set such
that the share of consumption of imported goods is approximately 19% of total expenditure
(see, e. g. , Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006]). The world interest rate r?, is set at 4%. Exports are
assumed to take a power form: X (p) = γXpνX with γX > 0 a scaling parameter. The real
exchange rate elasticity of exports denoted by νX is set to 0.8. Government spending as a
share of GDP g/Y is assumed to be 20%. The import content of government expenditure is
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set to 10% (see Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006]). The production function takes a Cobb-Douglas
form, Y = F (k) = kαK , with an output share of capital income, αK , set to 0.35. Finally, we
set δK at 5% so as to be consistent with a ratio investment-GDP roughly equal to 20%.
The critical parameters pertain to the weight of habits in utility, γ, and the speed of
adjustment, σ, in the determination of the reference stock. We set γ at 0.8 in line with
empirical estimates documented by Sommer [2007]. The relative-risk aversion parameter ² is
set at 2.5 which implies a long-run IES of ν = 1γ+²(1−γ) = 0.77 falling in the range of 0.5 and 1
of empirical estimates. Finally, we set σ at 0.5.
4.2 Steady-State Effects
We begin by examining the steady-state responses of a fiscal expansion, then turn to dynamic
effects. Quantitative estimation of the long-term and impact responses of key macroeconomic
variables are reported in Tables 1A and 1B respectively. We consider four alternative scenarios:
time preferences (γ = 0), benchmark parametrization (γ = 0.8, σ = 0.5), weak habits (γ = 0.3),
a faster speed of habits (σ = 0.9), a greater trade openness (ϕ = 0.5).6
Since the increase in government purchases is financed by a rise in lump-sum taxes in order
for the budget balanced condition to hold, a permanent fiscal expansion reduces households’
after-tax lifetime income. As agents feel poorer, they are induced to cut their real expenditure.
Real consumption is depressed further through an additional channel. An expansionary budget
policy triggers an excess of demand in the home good market which requires a larger steady-
state reduction in consumption. The associated long-term reduction in habits results in a
decrease in the stock of foreign assets as agents decumulate financial wealth to sustain their
original standard of living in the short-run. Additionally, in an open economy, a rise in gD
depresses further private demand through a long-term real exchange rate appreciation which
reduces exports.
Table 1A provides a sensitivity analysis regarding the long-term effects of a rise in gD. In line
with theoretical results, as habit persistence in consumption gets stronger, real consumption
11
falls by a larger amount. Whereas consumers cut their expenditure by around -0.8% of initial
GDP if preferences are time separable (i. e. , γ = 0), pcc˜ declines by -0.81% if habits are weak
(i. e. , γ = 0.3) and by -0.85% for the benchmark parametrization (i. e. , γ = 0.8). Hence,
as γ gets closer to unity, the long-run IES gets larger such that private consumption drops
further in response to the fall in private wealth. Additionally, as trade openness increases, the
domestic content of consumption expenditure falls which in turn moderates sizeably the drop
in private wealth measured in terms of the domestic good, and thereby softens considerably
the reduction of consumption in the long-run.
——————————————————
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
——————————————————
4.3 Dynamic Effects
Impact Effects
Without habits, the short-run marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is equal to unity
such that at the time when fiscal expansion is implemented, real consumption falls by the same
amount than the decline in real disposable income, leaving savings unaffected. In contrast, as
long as people pay attention to relative consumption in deriving utility, the short-term MPC
turns out to be smaller than unity. Henceforth, real consumption initially falls but by less
than in the long-term. The explanation is that, facing a fall in their disposable income due to
higher lump-sum taxes, habit-forming consumers are aware that their standard of living will
be lower at the steady-state, which drives down the marginal utility of future consumption.
At the time the fiscal expansion is implemented, the stock of habits remains fixed. Hence, the
marginal utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of future consumption,
which in turn provides a strong incentive to reallocate expenditure in the present. The rise in
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution yields a smooth initial response of consumption
in line with empirical evidence provided by Mountford and Uhlig [2005] and Afonso and Sousa
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[2009]. For the benchmark parametrization, the first row of Table 1B shows that the cut in
real expenditure at time t = 0 is about 2.5 times smaller than in the long run.
One prominent and consistent findings of the recent empirical literature on fiscal policy is
that investment is crowded-out by public spending. As we shall see now, short-run consumption
inertia plays a major role in accommodating this empirical fact. To derive the initial response
of investment, we differentiate the market-clearing condition for the home good:
dI(0) = −Θdp(0)− (cD/c)dc(0)− dgD. (11)
where Θ ≡ Xp
[
νX + c
D
X φαc
]
> 0 captures the impact of a change of the real exchange rate on
exports and consumption. Equation (11) shows that the initial reaction of investment is the
result of two opposing effects. On the one hand, the fall in private demand (i. e. , exports and
private consumption) releases resources for capital accumulation (see the first and second terms
on the RHS of (11)). On the other hand, higher public purchases withdraw resources from the
private sector, which implies the possibility that investment falls in the short-term (see the
last term on the RHS of (11)). If preferences are time separable (i. e. , γ = 0), investment is
unaffected as the economy reaches its new steady-state immediately. In contrast, regardless
of the strength of consumption inertia, the short-term decline in private demand is not large
enough to compensate for the rise in gD. Hence, an excess of demand arises in the home goods
market which must be eliminated by a decumulation of physical capital. Interestingly, as can
be seen from the last column of Table 1B, trade openness plays a major role in determining
the size of the crowding-out as investment falls by about -0.1%, which is more than three times
smaller than in the benchmark scenario. The reason for this is that as the economy gets more
open, the real exchange appreciation crowds-out consumption by a smaller amount and exports
by a much larger one.
Finally, from the fourth and fifth rows of Table 1B, the investment rate falls by 0.3% while
savings drops by 0.4% of initial GDP for the baseline calibration.7 Hence, the current account
enters into deficit. As expected, the worsening in the net foreign asset position is magnified as
trade openness increases due to the dramatic reduction of exports.
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—————————————————————–
< Please insert Figures 1(a), 1(b) about here >
—————————————————————–
Transitional Paths
The computed transitional paths for consumption and investment depicted in Figures 1(a)-
1(b) change dramatically in a habit-forming model. While the real exchange rate depreciation
(p˙(0) > 0) raises the consumption-based real rate of interest, the rise in the time preference
rate ρ is large enough to lead to a decreasing temporal path for consumption over a first
phase. The gradual fall in the reference stock reduces ρ which decreases monotonically during
the entire phase of adjustment. By approaching its new lower steady-state value from above,
the adjustment of real consumption releases resources for capital accumulation. After t ' 9
periods, the capital stock reaches its lowest value. Investment is crowded-in since output Y
now exceeds the demand for the domestic good. Because the rate of return on domestic assets
starts its decrease, the rate of real exchange rate depreciation gets smaller.
After 11 periods, consumption equalizes its new lower steady-state level and keeps on
decreasing. At time t ' 20 periods, the declining time preference rate equalizes the slippery
slope side of the consumption-based real interest rate’s hump-shaped transitional path. At
this point, real consumption reaches its lowest level and starts increasing. While savings
rises, Figure 1(b) indicates that the current account stays always in deficit due to a positive
investment flow.
4.4 Habit Persistence and Crowding-Out of Investment
—————————————————————–
< Please insert Figures 2(a), 2(b) about here >
—————————————————————–
We conducted a sensitivity analysis by plotting the size of the fall in the investment rate
after a rise in gD by 1 percentage point of GDP against the weight of habits in utility γ and
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the speed of habits σ, allowing for these two parameters to vary from 0 to 0.95 and 0.3 to 2
respectively. These two parameters jointly determine the strength of consumption inertia in
the short-term. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that investment is crowded-out further by public
spending as habit persistence gets stronger. More specifically, as γ increases from 0.1 to 0.9,
the rate of investment declines from 0.04% to 0.35% of initial GDP. If γ is kept fixed to 0.8,
the corresponding decline is from 0.3% to 0.4% of initial GDP as σ increases from 0.5 to 1.5.
The explanation is that as γ gets closer to unity and σ gets larger, the short-run MPC gets
smaller. Hence, private demand falls by a lower amount. Consequently, investment must be
crowded-out further in the short-term to eliminate the greater excess of demand in the home
goods market.
5 Conclusion
For countries of the euro area or a country that is in a “liquidity trap”, fiscal policy may be the
sole instrument of stabilization policy that the government may employ. Surprisingly, however,
the exploration of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy has only recently received notable
attention in the empirical literature. In this regard, one of the empirical facts for which the
profession seems to be in agreement is that a rise in public spending has a negative impact on
investment. However, in seeking a theoretical justification for this apparent stylized fact, recent
conclusions by Mountford and Uhlig [2005] cast doubt over standard Keynesian explanation
as a possibility. Similarly, the standard open economy version of the neoclassical RBC model
predicts that investment would be crowded-in by public spending. In this paper, we show
that by introducing habit-forming behavior into a dynamic general equilibrium model, one
can broaden the predictive power of the standard neoclassical model in order to accommodate
the observed negative relationship between investment and public spending. More precisely,
habit-forming consumers, confronted with a fall in their disposable income, are unwilling to cut
their real expenditure by a large amount and thus prefer to reallocate their real consumption
towards the present. This consumption inertia then implies that investment is crowded-out
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by fiscal spending. The reason behind this is that because consumption reacts weakly, the
decline in private demand fails to offset the rise in public spending, which in turn causes a fall
in investment. As long as consumers care about habits in deriving utility, the drop in savings
always more than offsets the decrease in investment such that the open economy experiences
a short-term current account deficit.
We also shed light on the role of habit persistence in consumption in determining the size
of the crowding-out of investment via numerical experiments. These show that as habit persis-
tence gets stronger, the crowding-out effect of fiscal expansion is smaller for real consumption
and larger for investment. For example, in the case of the latter, the drop in the investment
rate falls from 0.04% to around 0.35% percentage points of GDP as the weight assigned to
habits in utility increases from 10% to 90%. Moreover, as consumption inertia rises, the fall in
savings gets larger as individuals wish to sustain their original standard of living, and thereby
the open economy experiences a greater current account deficit. Finally, as trade openness
increases, both investment and consumption are crowded-out by a smaller amount and exports
by a larger one which worsens further the net foreign asset position.
Notes
1If agents anticipate a steady-state fall in consumption, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution gets
larger which provides an incentive for agents to reallocate consumption towards the present. Because the slope
of the indifference curves along a constant consumption path rises, individuals’ impatience increases. Therefore,
real consumption deviates from the usual perfectly smooth temporal profile and declines over time, whenever the
real interest rate is kept fixed. By shifting the time paths for consumption and thereby savings, the introduction
of habits affects the long-term response of consumption to a change of private wealth dictated by the long-run
IES denoted by ν.
2Since labor supply is inelastic and normalized to unity, employment will be dropped from the production
function.
3Since a rise in the relative price of foreign goods makes domestic goods cheaper, a real exchange rate
depreciation raises exports, i. e. , Xp (.) > 0.
4Linearizing the accumulation equation for habits (4), the dynamic equation for consumption (8), the accu-
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mulation equation for physical capital (9) (combined with (6)) and the dynamic equation for the real exchange
rate (7d), we obtain a four by four linearized system. Since the number of predetermined variables (s and k)
equals the number of negative eigenvalues, and the number of jump variables (c and p) equals the number of
positive eigenvalues, there exists a unique two-dimensional convergent path towards the steady-state.
5For all parametrization, we find that Φ1 < 0 and Φ2 > 0. Accordingly, a rise in k˜ or a decrease in s˜ leads
to a decumulation of traded bonds holding.
6Decreasing ϕ from 0.9 to 0.5 implies a rise in the import content of consumption expenditure from 15% to
55% and an increase in the exports-GDP ratio from 15% to 36%.
7Because consumption weakly reacts to the reduction of wealth when the expansionary budget policy is
implemented, the savings rate falls dramatically. As γ gets closer to 1 and σ gets larger, the short-term MPC
shrinks further. Hence, households are more reluctant to cut their real expenditure initially, and thus are more
willing to reallocate their consumption towards present by decumulating further the stock of financial wealth.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of the Crowding-Out Effect to γ and σ
Table 1: Quantitative Effects of a Permanent Fiscal Expansion (in %)
Variablesa TS Pref. γ = 0 (γ = 0.8, σ = 0.5) (γ = 0.3) (σ = 0.9) (ϕ = 0.5)
A.Long-Term
Consumption pcc˜ -0.80 -0.85 -0.81 -083 -0.48
Cons. in home good c˜D -0.84 -0.86 -0.84 -0.85 -0.55
Exports X˜ -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.45
B.Short-Term
Consumption pcc(0) -0.80 -0.34 -0.63 -0.31 -0.17
Cons. in home good cD(0) -0.84 -0.49 -0.71 -0.46 -0.44
Exports X(0) -0.16 -0.19 -0.16 -0.18 -0.48
Investment rate I(0) 0.00 -0.32 -0.13 -0.36 -0.09
Savings rate S(0) 0.00 -0.43 -0.16 -0.47 -0.23
Current account ca(0) 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15
aWe consider an increase in gD by 1 percentage point of GDP. All effects are scaled by initial GDP. TS
Pref.: time separable preferences.
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A Short-Run Static Solution
Solving the domestic goods market-clearing condition (9) for the rate of investment in capital
goods:
I = I
(
λ¯, c, p, k, gD
)
, (12)
where partial derivatives are given by
Ic =
∂I
∂c
= − (1− αc) pc < 0, (13a)
Ip =
∂I
∂p
= − (Xp − pp′′c c) < 0, (13b)
Ik =
∂I
∂k
= Fk > 0, (13c)
IgD =
∂I
∂gd
= −1 < 0. (13d)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
In this section, making use of general forms for preferences and production function, we prove
that the dynamic system exhibits saddle-point stability.
(
s˙, c˙, k˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
s(t)− s˜, c(t)− c˜, k(t)− k˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (14)
where J is given by
J ≡

−σ σ 0 0
a21 δ + σ a23 a24
0 Ic r? Ip
0 0 p˜Fkk 0

, (15)
where we used the fact that Ik − δK = r? we let
Γ = ucs +
σ
δ + 2σ
uss > 0. (16)
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and
a21 =
δ + 2σ
ucc
Γ < 0, (17a)
a23 = − λ¯pc
p˜ucc
(1− αc)Fkk > 0, (17b)
a24 =
λ¯pc (δ + σ)
uccp˜2
(1− αc) < 0. (17c)
The sign of Γ depends on ucs. If the marginal utility of real consumption is sufficiently in-
creasing in stock of habits, the preferences of the representative consumer display adjacent
complementarity and Γ is positive (see Ryder and Heal [1973]). If ucs has a negative or a small
positive value, Γ is negative and preferences are said to display distant complementarity. We
assume that Γ is positive which holds for the utility function (??) as longer as γ > 0.
Saddle-Point Stability
Denoting by µ the eigenvalue, the characteristic equation for the matrix (15) of the lin-
earized system writes as follows:
µ4 + b1µ3 + b2µ2 + b3µ+ b4 = 0, (18)
with
b1 = −trJ = −2r? < 0, (19a)
b2 = M2 = (r?)
2 −
{
σ (δ + σ)
ucc
[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
+ p˜Fkk
[
Ip − Ic λ¯pc
uccp˜2
(1− αc)
]}
≷ 0,(19b)
b3 = −M3 = r?
{
σ (δ + σ)
ucc
[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
+ p˜Fkk
[
Ip − Ic λ¯pc
uccp˜2
(1− αc)
]}
> 0, (19c)
b4 = DetJ =
σ (δ + σ) p˜Fkk
ucc
{
Ip
[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
− Ic λ¯pc
p˜2
(1− αc)
}
> 0, (19d)
where J is given by (15) and M2 and M3 are respectively the sum of all diagonal second and
third order minors of J (see Dockner and Feichtinger [1991], p. 45). The positive signs of (19c)
and (19d) stem from the following (imposed) inequality
ucs +
σ
δ + 2σ
uss < −
(
δ + σ
δ + 2σ
)
ucc. (20)
Imposing (20) ensures that adjacent complementarity is not too strong and that the dynamic
system exhibits a saddle point stability (see Becker and Murphy [1988]).
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The characteristic polynomial of degree four (18) can be rewritten as a characteristic poly-
nomial of second degree
θ2 +
b3
r?
θ + b4 with θ = µi (r? − µi) . (21)
By evaluating first the eigenvalues θ from the second order polynomial and then calculating µ
from the definition of θ, the four eigenvalues of the upper-left four by four sub-matrix in the
Jacobian are given by:
µi ≡ 12
r? ±
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
±
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, (22)
with
µ1 < µ2 < 0 < r? < µ3 < µ4. (23)
and having the following properties
r? − µ1 = µ4, r? − µ2 = µ3. (24)
The determinant of matrix J given by (19d) is positive, i. e. a4 > 0. This is consistent
with there being either 2 negative and 2 positive roots, 4 positive, or 4 negative roots. Since
the trace of the matrix J is equal to 2r? = −a1 (which is positive) and the trace is equal
to the sum of eigenvalues, only the first two cases have to be considered. By Descartes rule
of signs, necessary and sufficient conditions for the characteristic equation to have just two
positive roots is that either a2 < 0 or a3 > 0. From (19c), a3 > 0 so we can exclude the case
of four positive roots. Since the system features two state variables, s and k, and two jump
variables, c and p, the equilibrium yields a unique stable saddle-path.
Following Dockner and Feichtinger [1991], the necessary and sufficient conditions for saddle-
point stability with real roots write as follows:
b3
r?
> 0, (25a)
0 < 4b4 ≤
(
b3
r?
)2
. (25b)
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The first condition (25a) holds if the inequality (20) is respected. Expression
(
b3
r?
)2 − 4b4 can
be rewritten as:(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4 =
{
σ (δ + σ)
ucc
[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
− p˜Fkk
[
Ip − Ic λ¯pc
uccp˜2
(1− αc)
]}2
− 4σ (δ + 2σ)Fkk
ucc
ΓIc
λ¯pc
uccp˜
(1− αc) R 0. (26)
As the second condition (25b) may quite plausibly not hold, the system (14) exhibits saddle-
point behavior (as we have shown previously) but the stable roots may be either real or complex.
In the former case, trajectories may be monotonic or humped. In the latter case, the dynamics
involve cyclical behavior. As we shall see later, for plausible values of σ, formal solution are
real-valued.
Formal Solutions
Setting the constants A3 = A4 = 0 to insure a converging adjustment for all macroeconomic
aggregates, the stable paths are given by:
s(t)− s˜ = A1eµ1t +A2eµ2t, (27a)
c(t)− c˜ = ω12A1eµ1t + ω22A2eµ2t, (27b)
k(t)− k˜ = ω13A1eµ1t + ω23A2eµ2t, (27c)
p(t)− p˜ = ω14A1eµ1t + ω24A2eµ2t, (27d)
where the eigenvectors ωij associated with eigenvalue µi are given by
ωi2 =
(
σ + µi
σ
)
, (28a)
ωi3 = −
Ic (σ + µi)µi
σ [(r? − µi)µi + Ipp˜Fkk] , (28b)
ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3 = −p˜Fkk
Ic (σ + µi)
σ [(r? − µi)µi + Ipp˜Fkk] . (28c)
We normalized ωi1 to unity. The two constants write as follows
A1 =
dk˜ − ω23ds˜
ω23 − ω13
, A2 =
ω13ds˜− dk˜
ω23 − ω13
. (29)
To determine the signs of eigenvectors, we have to establish the signs of useful expressions.
The first one is straightforward:
a3
r?
>
√(a3
r?
)2 − 4a4 > 0. (30)
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Making use of (22), we can establish some conditions for the signs of the following expres-
sions:
µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk ≶ 0 depending on wether p˜FkkIp ≶ σ (δ + σ) , (31a)
µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk ≷ 0 depending on wether p˜FkkIp ≷ σ (δ + σ) . (31b)
Since for plausible (and a large range of) values of preferences and production-side parameters,
inequality 0 < p˜FkkIp < σ (δ + σ) numerically holds, we deduce that µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk < 0 and
µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk < 0 (see inequality (32b)).
From the discussion above, we assume thereafter that 0 < p˜FkkIp < σ (δ + σ) which implies
in turn:
(r? − µ1)µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk = µ4µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk < 0, (32a)
(r? − µ2)µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk = µ3µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk < 0. (32b)
In addition, the sign of eigenvector (σ + µ1) can be established as follows:
(σ + µ1) ≷ 0 depending on wether p˜FkkIp ≶ σ (δ + σ) . (33)
Imposing the inequality has the following implications for eigenvectors ω12 and ω
2
2:
(σ + µ1) > 0, (σ + µ2) > 0 if p˜FkkIp < σ (δ + σ) , (34)
where it is straightforward to deduce that (σ + µ2) > 0 since µ1 < µ2 < 0.
Signs of Eigenvectors
We write out the four eigenvectors ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalues µi with i = 1, 2,
to determine their signs:
ω1 =

1 (+)(σ+µ1
σ
)
(+)
− Ic(σ+µ1)µ1σ[(r?−µ1)µ1+Ipp˜Fkk] (+)
−p˜Fkk Ic(σ+µ1)σ[(r?−µ1)µ1+Ipp˜Fkk] (+)

, ω2 =

1 (+)(σ+µ2
σ
)
(+)
− Ic(σ+µ2)µ2σ[(r?−µ2)µ2+Ipp˜Fkk] (+)
−p˜Fkk Ic(σ+µ2)σ[(r?−µ2)µ2+Ipp˜Fkk] (+)

.
(35)
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Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
Using the market clearing condition (9), we may express the current account equation given
by (5) in terms of net exports:
b˙ = r?b+
X (p)
p
− p′c (p) c− gF . (36)
where the term X/p− cF − gF represents the balance of trade measured in terms of the foreign
good.
We first linearize equation (36) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜ (p(t)− p˜)− p′c (p˜) (c(t)− c˜) (37)
with
Ω˜ ≡ 1
p˜
[
X˜
p˜
(ν˜X − 1) + c˜F ν˜F
]
= −1
p˜
[
Ip +
X˜
p˜
]
> 0, (38)
where νX ≡ XppX > 0 and νF = −p
′′
c p
p = φ (1− αc) > 0 represent respectively the elasticities
of domestic exports and imports. Expression (38) gives the net exports reaction expressed
in terms of the foreign good to a change in the real exchange rate. We assume that the
generalized version of the Marshall-Lerner condition, that is with an unbalanced trade balance,
holds. Hence, a rise in the relative price of import goods leads to an improvement of the trade
balance evaluated at the steady-state, so we set Ω˜ > 0. Second equality of (38) has been
obtained by substituting the expression of Ip which is equal to − (Xp − pp′′c c).
Inserting the stable solutions for (p(t)− p˜) and (c(t)− c˜) given respectively by (27d) and
(27b), the solution for the current account writes as follows :
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Ω˜
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
4e
µit − p′c
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit. (39)
Solving the differential equation leads to:
b(t)− b˜ =
[(
b0 − b˜
)
− N1A1
µ1 − r? −
N2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t
+
N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (40)
where
N1 = Ω˜ω14 − p′c
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
, N2 = Ω˜ω24 − p′c
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
. (41)
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Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, i. e. equation (??), we
obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? +
N2A2
µ2 − r? . (42)
For the national intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (40) must
be null, so the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to
b(t)− b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (43)
Inserting the values for the constants A1 and A2 given by equations (37), we obtain (af-
ter some tedious computations) the linearized version of the national intertemporal budget
constraint expressed as a function of initial stocks of capital and habits:
b˜− b0 = Φ1
(
k˜ − k0
)
+Φ2 (s˜− s0) , (44)
with
Φ1 =
(µ1 − r?)N2 − (µ2 − r?)N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) ≶ 0, (45a)
Φ2 =
(µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) > 0, (45b)
where
(
ω23 − ω13
)
> 0 is given by
ω23 − ω13 =
Ic (µ1 − µ2) {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
σ [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
=
(+)
(+)
> 0, (46)
where we have used the fact that µ3 − µ4 = µ1 − µ2 and µ1µ3 − µ2µ4 = r? (µ1 − µ2). The sign
of (46) stems from: µ1 − µ2 < 0, Ic < 0, together with
µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= [Ipp˜Fkk + µ1µ2] (σ + µ1) + µ2 [Ipp˜Fkk + µ1µ4] = (+) + (+) > 0, (47)
where [Ipp˜Fkk + µ1µ4] < 0 (see (32a)).
In addition, we have computed the following expressions:
(µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
=
(1− αc) (pc)2 Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
σ2 [(r? − µ1)µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk] [(r? − µ2)µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk]
× (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) (µ2 − µ1) [r
? − (µ1 + µ2)]
σ2 [(r? − µ1)µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk] [(r? − µ2)µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk] =
(+)
(+)
> 0. (48)
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and
(µ1 − r?)N2 − (µ2 − r?)N1
= pcp˜Fkk
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
] [
Ipp˜Fkk (µ2 − µ1) (σ + r?) + (σ + µ2)µ1 (µ4)2 − (σ + µ1)µ2 (µ3)2
]
p˜σ [(r? − µ1)µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk] [(r? − µ2)µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk]
+αcpc
µ3µ4 (µ2 − µ1) [Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)] + µ1µ2 (σ + r?)]
p˜σ [(r? − µ1)µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk] [(r? − µ2)µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk] ≷ 0. (49)
By using the second equality of (38) and after some algebra, N1 and N2 can be rewritten
as follows
N1 = −pc
(
σ + µ1
σ
) p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ4µ1
p˜ [µ4µ1 + Ipp˜Fkk]
 ≶ 0, (50a)
= (−)×
{
(+) + (−)
(−)
}
.
N2 = −pc
(
σ + µ2
σ
) p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ3µ2
p˜ [µ3µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk]
 ≷ 0, (50b)
= (−)×
{
(+) + (−)
(−)
}
.
The signs of N1 and N2 remain undetermined since the numerator is the sum of a positive
term and a negative term. We do not impose any sign to expressions (50a)-(50a) but for all
parametrization, simulations indicate that N1 < 0 whereas N2 ≷ 0. The sign of N2 relies upon
the strength of habit persistence in consumption which size depends on γ and σ; furthermore,
its sign is quite sensitive to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ between cD and cF
since this parameter influences the magnitude of the first in square brackets (i. e. Ip), that is
the Marshall-Lerner condition.
We have computed an expression of Φ1 by making use of (49) and (46) in order to have an
analytical expression that allows to bring out the parameters which influences its size:
Φ1 = −
Fkk
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
] [
Ipp˜Fkk (µ2 − µ1) (σ + r?) + (σ + µ2)µ1 (µ4)2 − (σ + µ1)µ2 (µ3)2
]
(1− αc)µ3µ4 (µ1 − µ2) {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
+
1
p˜
(
αc
1− αc
)
≶ 0. (51)
In addition, we have evaluated Φ2 by making use of (48) and (46):
Φ2 =
pcFkk
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
]
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) [r? − (µ1 + µ2)]
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]} =
(+)
(+)
> 0, (52)
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where the sign of (51) comes from the assumption of a low value of αc as data suggest it (close
to 20%). The sign of (52) has been determined by rewriting the term in square brackets located
in the denominator as follows:
µ1µ2σ (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkkσ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= −µ1µ2 [Ipp˜Fkk + µ1µ4] + (σ + µ1) [µ1µ2 (σ + µ4) + Ipp˜Fkk (σ + µ2)] > 0,
where we used the fact that σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)] = (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) − µ1µ2 and σ (σ + r?) =
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ4)] = (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)− µ1µ4.
Formal Solution for the Stock of Financial Wealth
Financial wealth measured in terms of the domestic good, a(t), is equal to the sum of the
stock of foreign assets, p(t)b(t), measured in terms of the foreign good and the capital stock.
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = a˙(t)) is given by:
a˙(t) = rK(t)a(t) + w(t)− pc (p(t)) c− T, (53)
where lump-sump taxes cover overall government spending, i. e. T = gD+pgF . Remembering
that w = Fn and rK = Fk − δK , and linearizing (53) in the neighborhood of the steady-state,
we get:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜) + Fkkp˜b˜
(
k(t)− k˜
)
− pc (c(t)− c˜)−
(
c˜F + gF
)
(p(t)− p˜) , (54)
where we used the fact that r˜K ≡ Fk − δK = r? at the steady-state; we used property Fkn =
− knFkk of the linear homogenous function and a ≡ pb+ k to rewrite Fkka˜+ Fkn as Fkkp˜b˜.
By inserting the stable solutions, using the fact that ωi3 =
µi
p˜Fkk
ωi4, and rearranging terms,
the solution for the stock of financial wealth writes as follows:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜)−
2∑
i=1
[
(r? − µi) b˜+ X˜
p˜
]
ωi4Aie
µit − pc
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit, (55)
where we used the fact that
(
c˜F + gF
)
= r?b˜+ X˜p˜ .
Solving the differential equation leads to:
a(t)− a˜ =
[
(a0 − a˜)− S1A1
µ1 − r? −
S2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t +
S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (56)
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where
S1 = −
[
µ4b˜+
X˜
p˜
]
ω14 − pcω12 < 0, (57a)
S2 = −
[
µ3b˜+
X˜
p˜
]
ω24 − pcω22 < 0, (57b)
with ω14 >, ω
2
4 > 0, ω
1
2 > 0, ω
2
2 > 0.
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, we get the linearized ver-
sion of the households’ intertemporal budget constraint:
a0 − a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? +
S2A2
µ2 − r? . (58)
For the intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (58) must be null, so
as the stable solution for the stock of financial wealth finally reduces to:
a(t)− a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (59)
C Steady-State Changes of Government Spending Shocks
C.1 Steady-State Changes
Totally differentiating equations (10) yields in matrix form
[
ucc +
(
δ+2σ
δ+σ
)
Γ
]
pcλ¯(1−αc)
p˜2
−pcp˜ 0 0
0 0 0 Fkk 0
−pc −
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
0 r? p˜r?
Ic Ip 0 r? 0
−Φ2 0 0 −Φ1 1


dc˜
dp˜
dλ¯
dk˜
db˜

=

0
0
dgD + p˜dgF
dgD
db0 − Φ1dk0 − Φ2ds0

, (60)
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where
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
= X˜/p˜.
Before turning to long-run changes, we introduce some useful properties we will use later:
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) = σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)] + µ1µ2 > 0, (61a)
µ3µ4 = (r? − µ1) (r? − µ2) = r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] + µ1µ2 > 0. (61b)
Wa calculate the determinant D which is given by:
D ≡ Fkk pc
p˜
{
−p˜Ipr?Φ2 + pc
[
Ip + (1− αc)
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)]}
,
≡ Fkk pc
p˜
{
−p˜Ipr?Φ2 + pc
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]}
, (62)
= (−)× (−) > 0,
where we used the market-clearing condition, i. e. c˜F + gF − r?b˜ = X˜/p˜ (see eq (10b)). To
determine the sign of the determinant D, we have rewritten the term in square brackets as
follows by making use of properties (61):
−p˜Ipr?Φ2 + pc
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
= pc
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]{
µ1µ2µ3µ4σ (σ + r?)
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
+
Ipp˜Fkk {σµ3µ4 [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]− r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)}
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
}
,
= pc
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
µ1µ2
{
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) Ipp˜Fkk + µ3µ4 [σ (σ + r?)− Ipp˜Fkk]
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
}
,
= pc
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
µ1µ2
{
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) Ipp˜Fkk
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
+
µ3µ4 {(σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)− [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]}
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
}
, (63)
= (−)×
{
(+)
(+)
}
< 0,
and by computing some useful expressions:
σµ3µ4 [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]− r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)
= µ1µ2 [(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)− µ3µ4] , (64a)
σ (σ + r?)− Ipp˜Fkk
= (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)− [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] > 0. (64b)
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Domestic Good gD
The long-run effects after an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
on the domestic good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system (10)
with respect to gD:
dc˜
dgD
=
ds˜
dgD
= −Fkk
D
pc
p˜
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (65a)
dp˜
dgD
= −Fkk
D
pc
p˜
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc) ≷ 0, (65b)
dλ¯
dgD
= −Fkk
D
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc)− Fkk
D
[
ucc +
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
Γ
](
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
≷ 0,(65c)
dk˜
dgD
= 0, (65d)
db˜
dgD
= −Fkk
D
pc
p˜
Φ2
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (65e)
where the determinant D > 0 is given by (65), Φ2 > 0 (see (52)), Ip + X˜p˜ =
− X˜p˜
[
νX + νf
p˜c˜F
X˜
− 1
]
< 0, and we have computed the following expression:
p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc
=
pcIpp˜Fkk {r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)− αcµ3µ4σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
+
pcp˜Fkk (1− αc) X˜p˜ (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)]− pcαcµ1µ2µ3µ4σ (σ + r?)
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
=
pcp˜Fkk (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)
[
(1− αc) (µ3µ4 − µ1µ2)
(
Ip + X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ1µ2Ip
]
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
− pcαcµ1µ2µ3µ4 {(σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)− [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]}
σµ3µ4 {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]} , (66)
=
(+)
(+)
− (+)
(+)
≷ 0,
with (µ3µ4 − µ1µ2) > 0 and
r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)− αcµ3µ4σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) [(1− αc)µ3µ4 − µ1µ2] + αcµ1µ2µ3µ4,
(1− αc)µ3µ4
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
− µ1µ2
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
= (1− αc) r? [r? − (µ1 + µ2)]
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
+ αcµ1µ2Ip < 0.
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The sign of (66) is ambiguous leaving the directions of steady-state changes (65b) and (65c)
undetermined.
The sign of dλ¯dgD is not clear-cut like in the standard model assuming TS preferences.
Intuitively, an increase in lump-sum taxes is necessary to finance the additional public spending
which in turn reduces unambiguously the disposable income of agents when expressed in terms
of the domestic good, that is r?p˜b˜+ Y˜ − T . However, because the long-run real exchange rate
appreciation raises the disposable income measured in terms of the foreign good by increasing
domestic output net of taxes, the sign of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal
utility of wealth dλ¯ is not clear-cut, like in the time separability utility case. Since for all
parametrization, the marginal utility jumps upward after a fiscal expansion, we assume now
and thereafter that λ¯ rises.
While the representative agent’s disposable income may rise or fall when expressed in terms
of the foreign good, due to a possibly real exchange rate’s long-run decline, when it is measured
in terms of the domestic good, that is r?p˜b˜+ F
(
k˜
)
− T , the disposable income of individuals
falls unambiguously due to the rise in lump-sum taxes, T , and the long-run fall in traded
bonds’ holding, b˜, keeping in mind that the capital stock, k˜, remains unchanged in the long-
run. Consequently, the marginal utility of wealth expressed in terms of the domestic good
unambiguously rises after an unexpected permanent increase in government spending, that is:
d
dp
[
pcλ¯
p˜
]
=
pc
p˜
dλ¯
dgD
− λ¯pc (1− αc)
p˜2
dp˜
dgD
,
= −Fkk
D
[
ucc +
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
Γ
](
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
> 0.
Import Good gF
The long-run effects after an unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure
on the foreign good are obtained from the total differential of the equilibrium system (10) with
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respect to gF :
dc˜
dgF
=
ds˜
dgF
= −Fkk
D
pcIp = −(+)(+) < 0, (67a)
dp˜
dgF
= −Fkk
D
(1− αc) (pc)2 = −(−)(+) > 0, (67b)
dλ¯
dgF
= − p˜Fkk
D
{[
(1− αc) pc
p˜
]2
λ¯+ Ip
[
ucc +
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
Γ
]}
= −(−)
(+)
> 0, (67c)
dk˜
dgF
= 0, (67d)
db˜
dgF
= −Fkk
D
pcIpΦ2 = −(+)(+) < 0, (67e)
where D > 0 is given by (65).
C.2 The Two-Step Solution Procedure
In this section, we calculate the signs of the partial derivatives of the steady-state functions
obtained in the first step of the two-step solution procedure by totally differentiating equa-
tions (10a) to (10b) without the intertemporal budget constraint, equation (10d). Totally
differentiating equations (10a)-(10b) yields in matrix form:
[
ucc +
(
δ+2σ
δ+σ
)
Γ
]
pcλ¯(1−αc)
p˜2
0 0
0 0 Fkk 0
−pc −
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
r? p˜r?
Ic Ip r
? 0


dc˜
dp˜
dk˜
db˜

=

pc
p˜ dλ¯
0
dgD + p˜dgF
dgD

, (68)
where
(
c˜F + gF − r?b˜
)
= X˜/p˜.
The determinant of the system matrix is given by:
G ≡ Fkkp˜r?
{[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
Ip − pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
Ic
}
< 0. (69)
From system (68), we can calculate the partial derivatives of the following steady-state
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functions:
k˜ = F−1k (r
?) , (70a)
s˜ = c˜ = m
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (70b)
p˜ = p
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (70c)
b˜ = b
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, (70d)
with
mλ¯ ≡
∂c˜
∂λ¯
=
Fkk
G
Ippcr
? =
(+)
(−) < 0, (71a)
mgD ≡
∂c˜
∂gD
= −Fkk
G
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜
r? =
(+)
(−) < 0, (71b)
mgF ≡
∂c˜
∂gF
= 0, (71c)
pλ¯ ≡
∂p˜
∂λ¯
= −Fkk
G
Icpcr
? =
(−)
(−) > 0, (71d)
pgD ≡
∂p˜
∂gD
= −Fkkp˜r
?
G
[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (71e)
pgF ≡
∂p˜
∂gF
= 0, (71f)
bλ¯ ≡
∂b˜
∂λ¯
=
Fkk
G
(pc)
2
p˜
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (71g)
bgD ≡
∂b˜
∂gD
=
Fkk
G
{[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
][
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
]
− p
2
c λ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
αc
}
,(71h)
= (+)× {(+)− (+)} ≷ 0,
bgF ≡
∂b˜
∂gF
=
p˜Fkk
G
{[
ucc +
(
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
)
Γ
]
Ip − p
2
c λ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
Ic
}
, (71i)
= (+)× {(+)− (−)} > 0,
where Ic < 0, Ip < 0.
In the second step, we obtain the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth by
inserting the functions for c˜ = s˜, p˜ and b˜ into the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint
(equation (10d)), keeping in mind that k˜ = constant:
[
b
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)− b0] = Φ1 (k˜ − k0)+Φ2 (m (λ¯, gD, gF )− s0) . (72)
which yields to
λ¯ = g
(
s0, k0, b0, g
D, gF
)
(73)
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where partial derivatives are given by:
dλ¯
dgD
≡ λgD = −
bgD − Φ2mgD
bλ¯ − Φ2mλ¯
> 0, (74a)
dλ¯
dgF
≡ λgF = −
bgF
bλ¯ − Φ2mλ¯
> 0, (74b)
dλ¯
db0
≡ λn = 1
bλ¯ − Φ2mλ¯
< 0, (74c)
dλ¯
dk0
≡ λk = − Φ1
bλ¯ − Φ2mλ¯
< 0, (74d)
dλ¯
ds0
≡ λs = − Φ2
bλ¯ − Φ2mλ¯
> 0, (74e)
where we used the fact that mgF = 0 and the signs of (74a) and (74b) correspond to these of
(65c) and (67c).
D Graphical Constructions of Stable Manifolds
We start the investigation of transitional dynamics by evaluating the constants after a govern-
ment spending shock, gj (with i = d, f):
A1
dgj
= − ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
ds˜
dgj
> 0, i = d, f, (75a)
A2
dgj
=
ω13
ω23 − ω13
ds˜
dgj
< 0, i = d, f, (75b)
where ω13 > 0, ω
2
3 > 0, ds˜/dg
j < 0 (for i = d, f).
From (75), we deduce the following property:
A2
dgj
= −ω
1
3
ω23
A1
dgj
, i = g, f. (76)
D.1 Stable Manifold in the (k, p)-space
The stable solution is given by the following system of equations
k(t)− k˜ = ω13A1eµ1t + ω23A2eµ2t, (77a)
p(t)− p˜ = ω14A1eµ1t + ω24A2eµ2t. (77b)
Demarcation Lines
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Time derivatives of solutions (77a) and (77b) and elimination of A1eµ1t and A2eµ2t leads
to a new linear differential equation system for k(t) and p(t)
k˙(t) =
[
µ1ω
1
3ω
2
4 − µ2ω23ω14
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
](
k(t)− k˜
)
−
[
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
]
(p(t)− p˜) , (78a)
p˙(t) =
[
ω14ω
2
4 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
](
k(t)− k˜
)
−
[
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
]
(p(t)− p˜) . (78b)
The new differential equation system has two stable roots µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0 with µ1 < µ2 < 0;
hence the steady-state is a stable node in (k, p)-space.
From (78), we determine the slopes of demarcation lines:
dp
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
=
µ1ω
1
3ω
2
4 − µ2ω23ω14
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
=
(−)
(−) > 0, (79a)
∂k˙
∂p
= −ω
1
3ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
= −(−)
(+)
> 0, (79b)
dp
dk
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
=
ω14ω
2
4 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1ω14ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
=
(−)
(0)
= −∞, (79c)
∂p˙
∂k
=
ω14ω
2
4 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
=
(−)
(+)
< 0, (79d)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and we have computed the following expressions:
µ1ω
1
3ω
2
4 − µ2ω23ω14
=
p˜Fkkω
1
3ω
2
3 (µ1 + µ2) (µ1 − µ2)
µ1µ2
=
(−)
(+)
< 0, (80a)
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13 = 0, (80b)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
=
p˜Fkkω
1
3ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1µ2
=
(−)
(+)
< 0. (80c)
Making use of expressions (80), the system (78) may be rewritten as follows:
k˙(t) = Θ1
(
k(t)− k˜
)
+Θ2 (p(t)− p˜) , (81a)
p˙(t) = Θ3
(
k(t)− k˜
)
, (81b)
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with
Θ1 =
µ1ω
1
3ω
2
4 − µ2ω23ω14
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
Θ2 =
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
= −(−)
(+)
> 0,
Θ3 =
ω14ω
2
4 (µ1 − µ2)
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
= p˜Fkk < 0,
Θ4 =
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
= 0,
where the multipliers Θi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be interpreted as partial speeds of adjustment
towards the steady-state.
Fiscal Expansion and Trajectories
The slope of the trajectory at time t is obtained by differentiating the system of equations
(77) with respect to time t and dividing the resulting expressions:
dp(t)
dK(t)
=
µ1ω
1
4A1e
µ1t + µ2ω24A2e
µ2t
µ1ω13A1e
µ1t + µ2ω23A2eµ2t
=
µ1ω
1
4A1e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2ω24A2
µ1ω13A1e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2ω24A2
. (82)
The slope of the trajectory at the initial point can be calculated from (82) by setting t = 0,
substituting the constants A1 and A2 given by (37) and taking into account that dk˜ = 0:(
dp
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
=
µ1ω
1
4A1/dg
D + µ2ω24A2/dg
D
µ1ω13A1/dgD − µ2ω23A2/dgD
,
=
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
=
(0)
(−) = 0. (83)
Letting time tend towards infinity, i. e. t→∞, in equation (82), one obtains the slope of
the trajectory approaching the steady-state:
(
dp
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
ω24
ω23
=
(+)
(+)
> 0. (84)
We compare the slope of the demarcation line k˙ = 0 with the slope of the trajectory
approaching the steady-state in the (k, p)-space:
(
dp
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
− dp
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= −µ2
(
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
)
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
= −(−)
(−) < 0, (85)
where ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14 > 0 is given by (80c). From (94), we can deduce the following inequality:
0 <
(
dp
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
dp
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
. (86)
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Transitional Dynamics for p(t) and k(t)
We calculate the initial changes of the real exchange rate and the investment in physical
capital.
A Rise in Government Spending on the Domestic Good
Setting t = 0 into (77b), differentiating with respect to gD, and noting that dk˜dgD = 0, the
real exchange rate appreciates initially following an unanticipated permanent rise in government
spending on the domestic good:
dp(0)
dgD
=
dp˜
dgD
+ ω14
A1
dgD
+ ω24
A2
dgD
,
=
dp˜
dgD
+
[
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgD
,
= −Fkk
D
pc
p˜
{
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc) +
[
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
ω23 − ω13
](
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)}
< 0, (87)
where we have rewritten the term in square brackets to determine its sign:
(p˜r?Φ2 − αcpc) +
[
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
ω23 − ω13
](
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
=
µ4ω
1
3
[
µ3ω
2
4
(
Ip + X˜p˜
)
+ p˜r?N2
]
− µ3ω23
[
µ4ω
1
4
(
Ip + X˜p˜
)
+ p˜r?N1
]
µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
− αcpcµ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
=
p˜Fkkω
1
3ω
2
3
(
Ip + X˜p˜
)
(µ3 − µ4) + p˜r?p′c
[(σ+µ1
σ
)
µ3ω
2
3 −
(σ+µ2
σ
)
µ4ω
1
3
]
µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
− αcpcµ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
=
pcIcp˜Fkk (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)
{
αcµ3µ4 (µ1 − µ2) Ip − µ1µ2 (µ3 − µ4)
[
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
]}
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
− αcpcµ3µ4Ic (µ1 − µ2)σ {µ1µ2 (σ + r
?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
= −pcIcµ1µ2
{ p˜Fkk (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) (µ3 − µ4) [Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜ ]
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)
− αcµ3µ4 (µ1 − µ2) {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)}
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
) }, (88)
= (+)×
{
(−)
(+)
− (+)
(+)
}
< 0,
where we used the definition of Φ2 (see (50b)) and collected terms to obtain the first line; then
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we have evaluated the term in square brackets as follows to determine the second line:
µ3ω
2
4
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
+ p˜r?N2
= −
[
µ2ω
2
4
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
+ p˜r?p′c
(
σ + µ2
σ
)]
,
µ4ω
1
4
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
+ p˜r?N1
= −
[
µ1ω
1
4
(
Ip +
X˜
p˜
)
+ p˜r?p′c
(
σ + µ1
σ
)]
,(
σ + µ1
σ
)
µ3ω
2
3 −
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
µ4ω
1
3
=
Ic (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) Ipp˜Fkk (µ1µ4 − µ2µ3)
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
=
(+)
(+)
> 0,
p˜FkkIp (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)− µ1µ2σ (σ + r?)− Ipp˜Fkkσ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= µ1µ2 [Ipp˜Fkk − σ (σ + r?)]
= µ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)} < 0.
Finally by developing the terms in square brackets, using the two last expressions, collecting
terms, and rearranging, we obtain (88).
We turn to the investigation of transitional dynamics. Differentiate the stable solution for
k(t) and for p(t) w.r.t time, one obtains the capital stock and the real exchange transitional
dynamics:
k˙(t) = µ1ω13
A1
dgD
dgD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ1t + µ2ω23
A2
dgD
dgD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, (89a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω14
A1
dgD
dgD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ2t + µ2ω24
A2
dgD
dgD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, (89b)
where ω13 > 0, ω
2
3 > 0, ω
1
4 > 0, ω
2
4 > 0,
A1
dgD > 0,
A2
dgD < 0 (see (75)).
In a first place, we have to determine the initial changes of investment and the real exchange
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rate once it has jumped by setting t = 0 into (89):
dk˙(0)
dgD
= µ1ω13
A1
dgD
+ µ2ω23
A2
dgD
,
=
[
ω13ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
]
(µ2 − µ1) ds˜dgD < 0, (90a)
dp˙(0)
dgD
= µ1ω14
A1
dgD
+ µ2ω24
A2
dgD
,
= −
[
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgD
= 0, (90b)
where we have substituted the expressions of constants given by (75) and made use of (80b)
to determine (90b).
In a second place, we investigate in more details the condition of the non-monotonic ad-
justment of the investment in physical capital. More specifically, we must determine wether
there exists a critical value of time, t = tˆ > 0, such that investment , i. e. I
(
tˆ
)
= k˙
(
tˆ
)
= 0.
Solving the first line of (90a), we obtain:
tˆ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
D
µ1ω13A1/dgD
]
, (91)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for tˆ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
D
µ1ω13A1/dgD
< 1 ⇔ dk˙(0)
dgD
< 0. (92)
If the condition (92) holds, the stock of physical capital initially decreases before reaching a
turning point at time tˆ. Subsequently, investment turns to be positive and the stock of capital
goods increases towards its unchanged steady-state level.
Regarding the transitional path followed by the real exchange rate, it is convenient to
rewrite (89b) by using the fact that ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3 and property (76):
p˙(t) = −p˜Fkkω13
A1
dgD
dgD
(
1− e(µ1−µ2)t
)
eµ2t > 0. (93)
From (87) and (93), we deduce that the relative price of the foreign good jumps initially
downward and then the real exchange rate depreciates along a stable monotonic transitional
path.
A Rise in Government Spending on the Foreign Good
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Setting t = 0 into (77b), differentiating with respect to gF , and noting that dk˜dgF = 0,
the real exchange rate depreciates on impact following an unanticipated permanent rise in
government spending on the foreign good:
dp(0)
dgF
=
dp˜
dgF
+ ω14
A1
dgF
+ ω24
A2
dgF
,
= −
[
Ic
(
ω23 − ω13
)
+
(
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
)
Ip
Ip
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] ds˜
dgF
,
=
{
(Ic)
2 (µ1 − µ2)µ1µ2 [Ipp˜Fkk − σ (σ + r?)]
(σ)2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk] Ip
(
ω23 − ω13
)} ds˜
dgF
,
=
{
Icµ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)}
σIp {µ1µ2 (σ + r∗) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
}
ds˜
dgF
=
(+)
(−) × (−) > 0, (94)
where we used the following relationship
dp˜
dgF
= − Ic
Ip
ds˜
dgF
, (95)
and (80c) to obtain the second line. Then we have rewritten the following expressions:
Ic
(
ω23 − ω13
)
+
(
ω13ω
2
4 − ω23ω14
)
Ip
=
(Ic)
2 (µ1 − µ2)µ1µ2 [Ipp˜Fkk − σ (σ + r?)]
(σ)2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
=
(+)
(+)
> 0, (96a)
Ipp˜Fkk − σ (σ + r?) (96b)
= [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4) < 0, (96c)
and substituted the expression of
(
ω23 − ω13
)
given by (46) to obtain (94).
From (94) and (67b), the real exchange rate depreciates (i. e. p rises) in the short-run and
the long-run. We have now to evaluate if the real exchange rate initially overshoots or not its
steady-state value. Substituting (95) into (94), we have to evaluate if the following inequality
holds or not :
0 < −µ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)}
σ {µ1µ2 (σ + r∗) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]} < 1. (97)
By making use of (47), it is straightforward to show that the inequality above holds since by
rearranging terms, we get
(σ + µ1)
{
µ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] +
[
−µ1 (µ2)2 + σIpp˜Fkk
]}
> 0.
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We turn to the investigation of transitional dynamics following a rise in government spend-
ing on the foreign good. Differentiate the stable solution for k(t) and for p(t) w.r.t time, one
obtains the capital stock and the real exchange transitional dynamics:
k˙(t) = µ1ω13
A1
dgF
dgF︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ1t + µ2ω23
A2
dgF
dgF︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, (98a)
p˙(t) = µ1ω14
A1
dgF
dgF︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ2t + µ2ω24
A2
dgF
dgF︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, (98b)
where ω13 > 0, ω
2
3 > 0, ω
1
4 > 0, ω
2
4 > 0,
A1
dgF > 0,
A2
dgF < 0 (see (75)).
In a first place, we have to determine the initial changes of investment and the real exchange
rate once it has jumped by setting t = 0 into (89):
dk˙(0)
dgF
= µ1ω13
A1
dgF
+ µ2ω23
A2
dgF
,
=
[
ω13ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
]
(µ2 − µ1) ds˜dgF < 0, (99a)
dp˙(0)
dgD
= µ1ω14
A1
dgF
+ µ2ω24
A2
dgF
,
= −
[
µ1ω
1
4ω
2
3 − µ2ω24ω13
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgF
= 0, (99b)
where we have substituted the expressions of constants given by (75) and made use of (80b)
to determine (99b).
In a second place, we investigate in more details the condition of the non-monotonic ad-
justment of the investment in physical capital. More specifically, we must determine wether
there exists a critical value of time, t = tˆ > 0, such that investment reaches a turning point,
i. e. I
(
tˆ
)
= k˙
(
tˆ
)
= 0. Solving (98a), we obtain:
tˆ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
F
µ1ω13A1/dgF
]
, (100)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for tˆ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
F
µ1ω13A1/dgF
< 1 ⇔ dk˙(0)
dgF
< 0. (101)
If the condition (101) holds, the stock of physical capital initially decreases before reaching a
turning point at time tˆ. Subsequently, investment turns to be positive and the stock of capital
goods increases towards its unchanged steady-state level.
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Finally, we have to determine the condition according to which the real exchange rate
transitional path displays a non-monotonic pattern. We have to evaluate wether there exists
a critical value of time, t = t¯ > 0, such that the relative price of the foreign good reaches a
turning point, i. e. p˙ (t¯) = p˙ (t¯) = 0. Solving (98b), we obtain:
t¯ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
4A2/dg
F
µ1ω14A1/dgF
]
, (102)
where µ1 −mu2 < 0 and the necessary condition for t¯ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
4A2/dg
F
µ1ω14A1/dgF
< 1 ⇔ dp˙(0)
dgF
< 0. (103)
Since p˙(0) = 0 (and p˙(t) > 0), the condition (103) does not hold, and the real exchange rate
adjusts monotonically.
Regarding the transitional path followed by the real exchange rate, it is convenient to
rewrite (98b) by using the fact that ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3 and property (76):
p˙(t) = −p˜Fkkω13
A1
dgF
dgF
(
1− e(µ1−µ2)t
)
eµ2t > 0. (104)
From (94) and (104), we deduce that the relative price of the foreign good jumps initially
upward and then the real exchange rate depreciates along a stable monotonic transitional
path.
D.2 Stable Manifold in the (k, b)-space
The stable solution is given by the following system of equations:
k(t)− k˜ = ω13A1eµ1t + ω23A2eµ2t, (105a)
b(t)− b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (105b)
Demarcation Lines
Time derivatives of solutions (105a) and (105b) and elimination of A1eµ1t and A2eµ2t leads
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to a new linear differential equation system for k(t) and b(t)
k˙(t) =
(µ1 − r?)µ1ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)µ2ω23N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆k
(
k(t)− k˜
)
−
[
ω13ω
2
3 (µ1 − µ2)
∆k
](
b(t)− b˜
)
, (106a)
b˙(t) =
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆k
(
k(t)− k˜
)
−
[
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆k
](
b(t)− b˜
)
, (106b)
where
∆k =
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?) =
(−)
(+)
< 0. (107)
The new differential equation system has two stable roots µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0 with µ1 < µ2 < 0;
hence the steady-state is a stable node in (k, b)-space.
From (106), we determine the slopes of demarcation lines:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
=
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)ω13ω23 (µ1 − µ2)
=
(?)
(−) ≶ 0, (108a)
∂k˙
∂n
= −(µ1 − r
?) (µ2 − r?)ω13ω23 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
= −(−)
(−) < 0, (108b)
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
=
(?)
(−) ≶ 0, (108c)
∂b˙
∂k
=
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
=
(?)
(−) ≶ 0, (108d)
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 < 0 (see (48)). Several signs of expressions remain unde-
termined. The numerical analysis indicate that N1 < 0 and N2 > 0 for the benchmark
parametrization, although N2 may change of sign by assuming a small φ (higher but close to
unity).
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We have computed several expressions as follows:
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
=
(µ1 − µ2)ω13ω23
µ1µ2Ic
pc
p˜
{
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
)
µ2 (µ1 − µ3)
−µ1µ4
[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
)
+ αcµ2µ3
]}
= (+)× [(+) + (?)] ≷ 0, (109a)
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
=
pcIc (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)µ1µ2 (µ2 − µ1)
[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ3µ4
]
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
, (109b)
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
where
[
(µ2)
2 µ3 − (µ1)2 µ4
]
< 0 (see inequality (23)). To determine expression (109a), we
used the fact that µ31 − µ32 = (µ1 − µ2)
[
(µ1 + µ2)
2 − µ1µ2
]
and
(
µ31 − µ32
) − r? (µ21 − µ22) =
(µ1 − µ2) [µ1µ2 − (µ1µ4 + µ2µ3)]. According to equation (50b), if N2 > 0, then[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ2µ3
]
> 0 and equation (109a) is positive. Otherwise, if N2 < 0,
the sign of (109a) remains ambiguous.
Fiscal Expansion and Trajectories
The slope of the trajectory at time t is obtained by differentiating the system of equations
(105) with respect to time t and dividing the resulting expressions:
db(t)
dk(t)
=
µ1
N1A1
µ1−r? e
µ1t + µ2 N2A2µ2−r? e
µ2t
µ1ω13A1e
µ1t + µ2ω23A2eµ2t
=
µ1
N1A1
µ1−r? e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2 N2A2µ2−r?
µ1ω13A1e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2ω23A2
. (110)
The slope of the trajectory at the initial point can be calculated from (110) by setting t = 0,
and substituting the constants A1 and A2 given by (75):
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
=
µ1
N1
µ1−r?
A1
dgD + µ2
N2
µ2−r?
A2
dgD
µ1ω13
A1
dgD + µ2ω
2
3
A2
dgD
,
= −µ1 (µ2 − r
?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)ω13ω23 (µ2 − µ1)
(111)
= −(−)
(+)
> 0,
where we have substituted the expressions of constants (see (75)). The term located in the
numerator is given by (109b).
Letting time tend towards infinity, i. e. t → ∞, in equation (110), and keeping in mind
45
that µ1 − µ2 < 0, one obtains the slope of the trajectory approaching the steady-state:
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
N2
(µ2 − r?)ω23
=
(?)
(−) ≶ 0. (112)
Finally, it is convenient to compare the slope of the demarcation line k˙ = 0 with the slope
of the trajectory approaching the steady-state in the (k, b) space:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
−
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
= −µ2
[
(µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
]
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)ω13ω23 (µ1 − µ2)
= −(−)
(−) < 0, (113)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 > 0 is given by (48). From (113), we
can deduce the following inequality:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
<
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
< 0. (114)
Numerical Analysis, Case N2 > 0
Since the numerical analysis (for benchmark parametrization, see Table ??) allows for
dispelling the ambiguity regarding the signs of several expressions:
N1 < 0, N2 > 0, Φ1 < 0,
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 > 0,
we are able to indicate the signs of the slopes of demarcation lines and trajectories:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
=
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)ω13ω23 (µ1 − µ2)
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (115a)
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (115b)
∂b˙
∂k
=
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (115c)(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
N2
(µ2 − r?)ω23
=
(+)
(−) < 0. (115d)
Since the slopes of the demarcation lines k˙ = 0 and b˙ = 0 are both negative, we have to
compare them:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
− db
dk
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
[
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
]
(µ1 − µ2)N1N2
µ1µ2
[
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
]2 (116)
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
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µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 > 0 if N1 < 0 and N2 > 0.
In addition, we have to compare the slope of the demarcation line b˙ = 0 with the slope of
the trajectory when the system approaches the steady-state:
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
− db
dk
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
µ2N2
[
(µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
]
(µ2 − r?)ω23
[
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
] (117)
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
where we referred to expressions (48) and (109b) to determine the sign of (117).
From (115a), (115b), and (115d) and (113), (116) and (117), we deduce the following
inequalities:
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
<
(
db
dk
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
db
dk
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
< 0. (118)
Transitional Dynamics for b(t)
We turn now to the investigation of the transitional dynamics for the stock of international
assets.
Government Spending Shocks
In a first place, we have to determine the initial reaction of the current account. At this
end, we differentiate the two-dimensional stable solution for b(t) w.r.t time, evaluate at t = 0
and differentiate w.r.t gj . with i = d, f One obtains the initial response of the current account
following an unanticipated permanent rise in government expenditure on the domestic good:
db˙(0)
dgj
= µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
A1
dgj
+ µ2
N2
µ2 − r?
A2
dgj
i = d, f
= −
[
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω13N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] ds˜
dgj
, i = d, f (119)
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0,
where we have substituted the expressions of constants (see (75)); we used expression (109b)
and that fact that
(
ω23 − ω13
)
> 0 (see (46)) to determine the sign of (119). From (119), the
current account unambiguously deteriorates at time t = 0.
Along the stable path, the current account evolves according to the following dynamic
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equation:
b˙(t) = µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
A1
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ1t + µ2
N2
µ2 − r?
A2
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
eµ2t, i = d, f, (120)
where N1 < 0 (for all parametrization), N2 ≷ 0, µ1 < µ2 < 0, A1/dgj > 0, and A2/dgj < 0.
D.3 Stable Manifold in the (b, p)-space
The stable solution is given by the following system of equations:
p(t)− p˜ = ω14A1eµ1t + ω24A2eµ2t, (121a)
b(t)− b˜ = N1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
N2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (121b)
Demarcation Lines
Time derivatives of solutions (121a) and (121b) and elimination of A1eµ1t and A2eµ2t leads
to a new linear differential equation system for p(t) and b(t):
p˙(t) =
(µ1 − r?)µ1ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)µ2ω24N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆b (p(t)− p˜)
−ω
1
4ω
2
4 (µ1 − µ2)
∆b
(
b(t)− b˜
)
, (122a)
b˙(t) =
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆b (p(t)− p˜)
−
[
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)∆b
](
b(t)− b˜
)
, (122b)
where
∆b =
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?) =
(−)
(+)
< 0. (123)
The new differential equation system has two stable roots µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0 with µ1 < µ2 < 0;
hence the steady-state is a stable node in (b, p)-space.
From (122), we determine the slopes of demarcation lines:
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
=
(µ1 − r?) (µ2 − r?)ω14ω24 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
=
(−)
(+)
< 0, (124a)
∂p˙
∂b
= −(µ1 − r
?) (µ2 − r?)ω14ω24 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
= −(−)
(−) < 0, (124b)
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2) =
(−)
(?)
≶ 0, (124c)
∂b˙
∂p
=
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
=
(?)
(−) ≶ 0. (124d)
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We have computed several expressions as follows:
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
= p˜Fkk
[
(µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1
]
> 0, (125a)
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
= −p˜Fkk (µ2 − r
?)µ1ω23N1 − (µ1 − r?)µ2ω13N2
µ1µ2
= (+)× (−)
(+)
< 0, (125b)
µ1 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1 − µ2 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2
=
ω14ω
2
4
Icp˜Fkk
pc
p˜
{
µ3
[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
)
+ αcµ1µ4
]
+µ2
[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜
p˜
)
+ αcµ3µ4
]}
= (+)× [(−) + (−)] < 0. (125c)
We used the fact that ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3 > 0 to rewrite (125a) and (125b). The sign of (125b) follows
from the following inequality (µ1 − r?)ω13N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω23N1 < 0. The sign of (125b) follows
from (109b). Regarding the sign of (125c), the first term in square brackets has an ambiguous
sign. Since for all parametrization, numerical results indicate that N1 < 0, we thus assume
that the following inequality holds such that
[
p˜Fkk
(
Ip + (1− αc) X˜p˜
)
+ αcµ1µ4
]
< 0.
Fiscal Expansion and Trajectories
The slope of the trajectory at time t is obtained by taking the time derivative of the system
of equations (121) and dividing the resulting expressions:
dp(t)
db(t)
=
µ1ω
1
4A1e
µ1t + µ2ω24A2e
µ2t
µ1
N1A1
µ1−r? e
µ1t + µ2 N2A2µ2−r? e
µ2t
=
µ1ω
1
4A1e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2ω24A2
µ1
N1A1
µ1−r? e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2 N2A2µ2−r?
. (126)
The slope of the trajectory at the initial point can be calculated from (126) by setting t = 0,
and substituting the constants A1 and A2 given by (75):(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
=
µ1ω
1
4
A1
dgD + µ2ω
2
4
A2
dgD
µ1
N1
µ1−r?
A1
dgD + µ2
N2
µ2−r?
A2
dgD
= 0, (127)
where we have substituted the expressions of constants (see (75)) and used the fact that ωi4 =
p˜Fkk
µi
ωi3 (with i = 1, 2).
Letting time tend towards infinity, i. e. t → ∞, in equation (126), and keeping in mind
that µ1 − µ2 < 0, one obtains the slope of the trajectory approaching the steady-state:(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
(µ2 − r?)ω24
N2
=
(−)
(?)
≶ 0. (128)
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We have to consider two cases, according to wether N2 ≷ 0. Assuming that N2 > 0, we
get:
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
∂b˙
∂p
=
(+)
(−) < 0,
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
(−)
(+)
< 0. (129)
Since the locus p˙ = 0 and b˙ = 0 are both negatively sloped, we have to estimate wether p˙ = 0
is steeper or not than b˙ = 0. Thus, we subtract (124c) from (124a):
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
− dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
µ1µ2
[
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
]2[
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
]
(µ1 − µ2)N1N2
=
(+)
(+)
> 0. (130)
From (130), we can deduce that the locus b˙ = 0 is steeper than the locus p˙ = 0.
In addition, we have to compare the slope of the demarcation line p˙ = 0 with the slope of
the trajectory when the system approaches the steady-state:
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
− dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
=
µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω24
[
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
]
N2
[
µ1 (µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − µ2 (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
] (131)
=
(−)
(+)
< 0,
where we referred to expressions (125a) and (125b) to determine the sign of (131).
From (124a), (124c), (128), (130), and (131), we deduce the following inequalities in the
case N2 > 0:
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
<
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
< 0. (132)
Instead, by assuming that N2 < 0, we get:
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
=
(−)
(−) > 0,
∂b˙
∂p
=
(−)
(−) > 0,
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
(−)
(−) > 0. (133)
In addition, we have to compare the (positive) slope of the demarcation line b˙ = 0 with the
(positive) slope of the trajectory when the system approaches the steady-state:
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
− dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
= −µ2
[
(µ1 − r?)ω14N2 − (µ2 − r?)ω24N1
]
N1N2 (µ1 − µ2)
= −(+)
(−) > 0, (134)
where the sign follows from equation (125b) and the fact that the case N2 < 0 is considered.
50
From (124a), (124c) and (134), we can deduce the following inequalities in the case N2 < 0:
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
p˙=0
< 0 <
(
dp
db
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
dp
db
∣∣∣∣
b˙=0
. (135)
The Pattern of the Transitional Path in the (b, p)-space
To investigate in more details the conditions under which the stock of foreign bonds adjusts
non monotonically, we have to determine wether there exists a critical value of time, denoted
by t = t˜ > 0, such that the stock of traded bonds reaches a turning point along the stable
trajectory, i. e. ca
(
t˜
)
= b˙
(
t˜
)
= 0. Setting (120) equal to zero and solving for t˜, we get:
t˜ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2 (µ1 − r
?)N2A2/dgj
µ1 (µ2 − r?)N1A1/dgj
]
, (136)
where N1 < 0 for all parametrization and N2 ≷ 0.
In the case N2 > 0, the critical value of time along the transitional path does not exist
since the term in square brackets is negative.
Unlike, in the case N2 < 0, there exists a critical value of time, t = t˜ > 0, such that the
stock of international assets reaches a turning point along the trajectory under the necessary
condition:
µ1
N1
µ1 − r?
A1
dgj
+ µ2
N2
µ2 − r?
A2
dgj
< 0. (137)
In conclusion, regardless of the sign of N2, the current account unambiguously deteriorates
at time t = 0. If N2 < 0, the current account turns positive at time t˜ while the stock of
international assets starts growing to its new lower steady-state level. Instead, if N2 > 0,
traded bonds holding falls monotonically and the current account stays in deficit while its size
in absolute terms decreases.
D.4 Stable Manifold in the (s, c)-space
The stable solution is given by the following system of equations
s(t)− s˜ = A1eµ1t +A2eµ2t, (138a)
c(t)− c˜ = ω12A1eµ1t + ω22A2eµ2t. (138b)
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Demarcation Lines
Time derivatives of solutions (138a) and (138b) and elimination of A1eµ1t and A2eµ2t leads
to a new linear differential equation system for s(t) and c(t)
s˙(t) =
[
µ1ω
2
2 − µ2ω12
∆c
]
(s(t)− s˜)−
[
µ1 − µ2
∆c
]
(c(t)− c˜) , (139a)
c˙(t) =
[
ω12ω
2
2 (µ1 − µ2)
∆c
]
(s(t)− s˜)−
[
µ1ω
1
2 − µ2ω22
∆c
]
(c(t)− c˜) , (139b)
with
∆c =
µ2 − µ1
σ
> 0. (140)
The new differential equation system has two stable roots µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0 with µ1 < µ2 < 0
(see (23)); hence the steady-state is a stable node in (s, c)-space.
From (139), we determine the slopes of demarcation lines:
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
=
µ1ω
2
2 − µ2ω12
µ1 − µ2 = 1, (141a)
∂s˙
∂c
= σ > 0, (141b)
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
c˙=0
=
ω12ω
2
2 (µ1 − µ2)
µ1ω12 − µ2ω22
=
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
=
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)] + µ1µ2
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= 1 +
µ1µ2
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
=
(+)
(?)
, (141c)
∂c˙
∂s
= −(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)
σ
< 0, (141d)
where the sign of the slope of the demarcation line c˙ = 0 remains undetermined. More specifi-
cally, its sign depends crucially upon the degree of habit persistence in consumption, reflected
by |µ1|, and the price-elasticity of export demand, νX . For plausible values of parameters for
preferences, production function, and export function, we find that σ + (µ1 + µ2) > 0 and we
will assume that this inequality holds from thereon.
Since the demarcation lines c˙ = 0 and s˙ = 0 have positive slopes, we have to compare their
magnitudes:
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
− dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
c˙=0
= − µ1µ2
σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
< 0. (142)
from which we deduce the following inequality:
0 <
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
= 1 <
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
c˙=0
. (143)
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Fiscal Expansion and Trajectories
The slope of the trajectory at time t is obtained by differentiating the system of equations
(138) with respect to time t and dividing the resulting expressions:
dc(t)
ds(t)
=
µ1ω
1
2A1e
µ1t + µ2ω22A2e
µ2t
µ1A1eµ1t + µ2A2eµ2t
=
µ1ω
1
2A1e
(µ1−µ2)t + µ2ω22A2
µ1A1e(µ1−µ2)t + µ2A2
. (144)
The slope of the trajectory at the initial point can be calculated from (144) by setting t = 0,
and substituting the constants A1 and A2 given by (75)(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
=
µ1ω
1
2
A1
dgD + µ2ω
2
2
A2
dgD
µ1
A1
dgD + µ2
A2
dgD
=
[
µ1ω
1
2ω
2
3 − µ2ω22ω13
µ1ω23 − µ2ω13
]
=
(−)
(−) > 0, (145)
where expressions in the numerator and the denominator of (145) write as follows:
µ1ω
1
2ω
2
3 − µ2ω22ω13
= −Icµ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2) (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) [r
? − (µ1 + µ2)]
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (146a)
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
= −Icµ1µ2 (µ2 − µ1) {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (µ4 − µ2)}
σ [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (146b)
where we used the fact that µ1µ4 − µ2µ3 = (µ1 − µ2) [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] and
Ipp˜Fkk + µ1µ2 − σ [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] = [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (µ4 − µ2) < 0.
Letting time tend towards infinity, i. e. t→∞, in equation (144), one obtains the slope of
the trajectory approaching the steady-state:(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
= ω22 =
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
> 0, (147)
with 0 <
(σ+µ2
σ
)
< 1. Thus we can infer the following inequality:
0 <
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
. (148)
We compare the slope of the trajectory at the initial point with the slope of the trajectory
approaching the steady-state:(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
−
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
=
µ1 (µ1 − µ2)ω23
µ1ω23 − µ2ω13
=
(+)
(−) < 0, (149)
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µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13 < 0 is given by (146b). From (149), we can deduce the following inequality:
0 <
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
<
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
. (150)
Finally, we compare the slope of the trajectory at the initial point with the slope of the
demarcation line s˙ = 0:
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
−
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
=
(µ1)
2 ω23 − (µ2)2 ω13
σ
(
µ1ω23 − µ2ω13
) = (+)
(−) < 0, (151)
(µ1)
2 ω23 − (µ2)2 ω13 > 0 and µ1ω23 − µ2ω13 < 0.
From (143), (149) and (151), we deduce the following inequality:
0 <
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→0
<
(
dc
ds
) ∣∣∣∣
t→∞
<
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
s˙=0
= 1 <
dc
ds
∣∣∣∣
c˙=0
. (152)
Transitional Dynamics for s(t) and c(t)
We turn now to the investigation of the transitional dynamics for the stock of habits and
the real consumption.
Government Spending Shocks
The stable solution for c(t) is given by:
c(t) = c˜+
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
A1e
µ1t +
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
A2e
µ2t,
where we have substituted the expressions of eigenvectors ω12 and ω
2
2. Setting t = 0, differ-
entiating with respect to gj (with i = d, f), and substituting the constants given by (75), we
obtain the initial response of real consumption following an unanticipated permanent rise in
government spending:
dc(0)
dgj
=
dc˜
dgj
+
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
A1
dgj
+
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
A2
dgj
= −
[
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] dc˜
dgj
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0, i = d, f (153)
where ω23 − ω13 > 0 and µ1ω23 − µ2ω13 < 0 is given by (146b).
Equation (153) indicates that real consumption falls initially as in the long-run. In addition,
we have to evaluate the magnitude of the initial change w. r. t. the long-run variation. At this
end, we determinate if the numerator is lower or higher than the denominator. Using (46) and
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(146b), we can rewrite the term in square brackets, appearing in expression (153) of the initial
change of the real consumption, as follows:
−
[
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) ]
= −µ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (µ4 − µ2)}
σ {µ1µ2 (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkk [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]}
=
µ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (µ4 − µ2)}
µ1µ2 {[µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4)} − (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) Ipp˜Fkk , (154)
=
(−)
(−) > 0,
where Ic and (µ2 − µ1) cancel to obtain the first line and we have rewritten the term in square
brackets located in the denominator as follows:
µ1µ2σ (σ + r?) + Ipp˜Fkkσ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)]
= (σ + µ1) [µ1µ2 (σ + µ4) + (σ + µ2) Ipp˜Fkk]− µ1µ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] > 0, (155)
where we used the fact that σ (σ + r?) = (σ + µ1) (σ + µ4) − µ1µ4 and σ [σ + (µ1 + µ2)] =
(σ + µ1) (σ + µ2)− µ1µ2.
Because (σ + µ4) > (µ4 − µ2) (since (σ + µ2) > 0), the first term in square brackets in
the denominator of (154) is higher than numerator. Therefore, real consumption decreases
instantaneously after a permanent fiscal expansion, but by a lower amount than in the long-
run. This behavior is due to the existence of habit persistence in consumption which makes
agents reluctant to reduce strongly their real consumption and incites them to decumulate
financial wealth in order to maintain their habitual standard of living. We can summarize our
discussion with the following inequality:
dc˜
dgj
<
dc(0)
dgj
< 0, i = d, f. (156)
Differentiate the stable solution for s(t) and for c(t) w. r. t. time, we get the temporal
paths followed by habits and real consumption:
s˙(t) = µ1
A1
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ1t + µ2
A2
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, i = d, f, (157a)
c˙(t) = µ1
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
A1
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
eµ1t + µ2
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
A2
dgj
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
eµ2t, i = d, f, (157b)
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where A1/dgj > 0 and A2/dgj < 0 (see (75)). At a first sight, from (157), the transitional
paths for c(t) and s(t) may be monotonic or non-monotonic.
Evaluate (157a) and (158c) at time t = 0, we obtain the initial changes of s and c once real
consumption jumped:
ds˙(0)
dgj
= µ1
A1
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+µ2
A2
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
,
= −
[
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
ω23 − ω13
]
ds˜
dgj
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0, (158a)
dc˙(0)
dgj
= µ1
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
A1
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+µ2
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
A2
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
, (158b)
= −
[
µ1 (σ + µ1)ω23 − µ2 (σ + µ2)ω13
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] dc˜
dgj
= −(−)
(+)
× (−) < 0, (158c)
with
(
ω23 − ω13
)
> 0, and
µ1 (σ + µ1)ω23 − µ2 (σ + µ2)ω13
= −Icµ1µ2 (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) (µ1 − µ2) [r
? − (µ1 + µ2)]
σ [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
= −(+)
(+)
< 0, (159)
where we used the fact that µ1µ4 − µ2µ3 = [r? − (µ1 + µ2)] > 0.
We investigate in more details the condition of the non-monotonic adjustment of the ref-
erence stock and the real consumption. Adopting the same procedure than previously, there
exists a critical value of time, t = t´ > 0, such that the habit stock reaches a turning point, i. e.
s˙
(
t´
)
= s˙
(
t´
)
= 0. Solving the first line of (98a), we obtain:
t´ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj
]
, i = d, f, (160)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for t´ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj
< 1 ⇔ ds˙(0)
dgj
< 0. i = d, f. (161)
If the condition (161) holds, the stock of habits initially decreases before reaching a turning
point at time t´. Subsequently, accumulation of habits turns to be positive and the reference
stock increases towards its new lower steady-state level, i. e. s overshoots its long-term value.
56
Regarding real consumption’s transitional path, there exists a critical value of time, t =
t˘ > 0, such that the real consumption reaches a turning point, i. e. c˙
(
t˘
)
= 0. Solving the first
line of (98a), we obtain:
t˘ =
1
µ1 − µ2 ln
[
−µ2ω
2
2A2/dg
j
µ1ω12A1/dgj
]
, i = d, f, (162)
where µ1 − µ2 < 0 and the necessary condition for t˘ > 0 corresponds to:
0 < −µ2ω
2
2A2/dg
j
µ1ω12A1/dgj
< 1 ⇔ dc˙(0)
dgj
< 0. i = d, f. (163)
If the condition (163) holds, the real consumption initially decreases before reaching a turning
point at time t˘. Subsequently, the real consumption rises towards its new lower long-run level.
Finally, because µ1 < µ2 < 0, and (σ + µ1) > 0, (σ + µ2) > 0, we have 0 < ω12 < ω
2
2 which
implies in turn that µ2ω
2
2A2/dgj
µ1ω12A1/dgj
> µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj . Thus, we deduce the following inequality:
0 < t˘ < t´. (164)
In words, the trajectory cuts first the demarcation line c˙ = 0 at time t˘, and then cuts the
demarcation line s˙ = 0 at time t´ and finally the dynamic system approaches the steady-state.
D.5 Non-monotonic Transitional Paths and the Range of Dates
In this section, we determine analytically the range of dates, i. e. the time at which the dy-
namics of key economic variables change of direction as they follow non-monotonic transitional
paths. More specifically, we have four dates, say respectively tˆ, t˘, t´ and t˜ at which invest-
ment, real consumption, accumulation of consumption experience and current account change
of sign. The range of dates is not a crucial task but rather allows for a more rigorous discussion
of transitional paths. We have already shown that t˘ < t´ (see (164)). We have now to compare
tˆ with t´ and t˘ by making use of their expressions given respectively by (91), (160) and (162).
For the inequality tˆ < t´ to hold, the following condition must be satisfied
0 < −µ2A2/dg
j
µ1A1/dgj
< −µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
j
µ1ω13A1/dgj
< 1. (165)
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It is straightforward to show that this necessary condition is respected if ω23 − ω13 > 0. From
(46), the latter inequality holds such that tˆ < t´.
For the inequality tˆ < t˘ to hold, the following condition must be satisfied:
0 < −µ2ω
2
2A2/dg
j
µ1ω12A1/dgj
< −µ2ω
2
3A2/dg
j
µ1ω13A1/dgj
< 1. (166)
It is straightforward to show that this necessary condition is respected if ω12ω
2
3−ω22ω13 > 0. We
have computed the following expression to determine its sign:
ω12ω
2
3 − ω22ω13
=
Ic (σ + µ1) (σ + µ2) (µ1 − µ2) [µ1µ2 + Ipp˜Fkk]
σ2 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
=
(+)
(+)
> 0. (167)
Since inequality (166) holds, we can deduce the following time range for turning points:
0 < tˆ < t˘ < t´ < t˜. (168)
From (168), we can deduce that investment in physical capital changes of sign before real
consumption which itself changes of sign before accumulation of habits.
D.6 Dynamics for the Rate of Time Preference
As have underlined previously, the specification of a habit-forming behavior implies a variable
time preference rate. Following an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion, the time pref-
erence rate rises initially and then decreases over time toward its steady-state value, δ. The
reaction of ρ reflects the temporary gap between the marginal utility of current real expense and
the marginal utility of future real expense. In this section, we provide an analytical treatment
of the adjustment of the time preference rate following a permanent fiscal expansion.
The solution for the time preference rate is obtained by linearizing (??) in the neighborhood
of the steady-state and using the fact that ρ˜ = δ:
ρ(t) = δ +
p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + σ)ucc (c(t)− c˜) + p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜ (s(t)− s˜) + p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + σ)
pcλ¯ (1− αc)
p˜2
(p(t)− p˜) ,
= δ +
p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + σ)ucc
[
Ξ1A1eµ1t + Ξ2A2eµ2t
]
, (169)
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where
Ξ1 = ω12 +
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ) u˜11
+
pcλ¯
p˜u˜11
(1− αc)
p˜
ω14 = −
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ) u˜11
µ1
(δ + σ − µ1) < 0, (170a)
Ξ2 = ω22 +
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ) u˜11
+
pcλ¯
p˜u˜11
(1− αc)
p˜
ω24 = −
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ) u˜11
µ2
(δ + σ − µ2) < 0, (170b)
with Γ > 0. To determine the signs of Ξ1 and Ξ2, we made use of the second line of
(J − µiI4×4)ωij = 0.
We estimate the initial reaction of the time preference rate by evaluating (169) at time
t = 0 and by differentiating w. r. t. gj :
dρ(0)
dgj
=
p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + σ)ucc
[
Ξ1
A1
dgj
+ Ξ2
A2
dgj
]
,
= − p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ − µ1) (δ + σ − µ2)
(
ω23 − ω13
)
×
[
µ1µ2
(
ω23 − ω13
)− (δ + σ) (µ1ω23 − µ2ω13) ] ds˜dgj > 0, (171)
where ω23−ω13 > 0 (see (46)) and µ1ω23−µ2ω13 < 0 see (146b)). We have substituted the expres-
sions of constants given by (75) and made use of (170) to determine (171). From (171), the time
preference rate rises initially giving rise to a decreasing temporal path for real consumption
(see (??)).
We estimate now the initial change of the time preference rate by differentiating (169)
w. r. t. time t, evaluating this at time t = 0, and differentiating w. r. t. gj
dρ˙c(0)
dgj
=
p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + σ)ucc
[
µ1Ξ1
A1
dgj
+ µ2Ξ2
A2
dgj
]
,
= − p˜
pcλ¯
(δ + 2σ) Γ˜
(δ + σ − µ1) (δ + σ − µ2)
(
ω23 − ω13
)
×
[
µ1µ2
(
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
)− (δ + σ) (µ21ω23 − µ22ω13) ] ds˜dgj < 0, (172)
where µ21ω
2
3−µ22ω13 > 0 since ω23 > ω13 and µ21 > µ22. After its upward jump, the time preference
decreases. Performing a similar procedure than previously, it is straightforward to show that
the possibility of a non-monotonic adjustment rests on the condition of an initial positive
change of the time preference rate. Since this condition does not hold (see (172)), we can infer
that the time preference rate, ρ(t), decreases monotonically along the stable trajectory.
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E Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare effects of an unanticipated permanent rise in gov-
ernment spending, gj , falling on the domestic good (i = d) or the foreign good (i = f). We
denote by φ the instantaneous welfare:
φ(t) = u (c(t), s(t)) , (173)
and by U its discounted value over an infinite horizon:
U =
∫ ∞
0
φ(t) exp (−δt) dt. (174)
From (10a), the steady-state value of real consumption is given by:
c˜ =
[(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]− 1
γ+²(1−γ)
. (175)
Differentiating the felicity function (??) w. r. t. c and s and evaluate at the steady state using
(175), this yields to:
u˜c = c˜−[γ+²(1−γ)] =
(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
> 0, (176a)
u˜s = −γc˜−[γ+²(1−γ)] = −γ
(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
= −γu˜c < 0, (176b)
where a tilde over partial derivatives indicate that they are evaluated at the steady-state.
Furthermore, we have computed several useful expressions:
∆1 ≡ u˜c
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s =
(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
[
σ (1− γ) + µ1
σ
]
< 0, (177a)
∆2 ≡ u˜c
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s =
(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
[
σ (1− γ) + µ2
σ
]
> 0, (177b)
where we imposed the following condition which holds from plausible values of parameters (as
indicated by numerical analysis):
σ (1− γ) + µ1 < 0, σ (1− γ) + µ2 > 0. (178)
E.1 Instantaneous Welfare Effects
We first linearize the instantaneous utility function (??) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state:
φ(t) = φ˜+ uc (c˜, s˜) (c(t)− c˜) + us (c˜, s˜) (s(t)− s˜) , (179)
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with φ˜ given by
φ˜ = u (c˜, c˜) , (180)
where we used the fact c˜ = s˜.
By substituting solutions for s(t) and c(t), we obtain the two-dimensional stable solution
for instantaneous welfare:
φ(t) = φ˜+
[
u˜c
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
A1e
µ1t +
[
u˜s
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
A2e
µ2t, (181)
where a tilde indicates that the variable is evaluated at the steady-state, that is u˜c = uc (c˜, c˜)
and u˜s = us (c˜, c˜).
We investigate the initial reaction of instantaneous welfare. We evaluate (181) at time t = 0
and differentiate this w. r. t. gj :
dφ(0)
dgj
= (u˜c + u˜s)
ds˜
dgj
+∆1
A1
dgj
+∆2
A2
dgj
,
= −u˜c
[
µ1ω
2
3 − µ2ω13
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) ] ds˜
dgj
= u˜c
dc(0)
dgj
< 0, i = d, f, (182)
where µ1ω23 − µ2ω13 < 0 (see (146b)) and ω23 − ω13 > 0 (see (46)). The last equality has been
obtained by inspecting expression (153) that gives the initial reaction of real consumption.
Differentiate (180) w. r. t. gj , one obtains the long-run change of instantaneous welfare:
dφ˜
dgj
= (u˜c + u˜s)
dc˜
dgj
< 0, i = d, f. (183)
As longer as 0 ≤ γ < 1, an unexpected permanent fiscal expansion (regardless of the good on
which the fiscal expansion falls) induces a fall in the steady-state value of φ triggered by the
long-run fall in real consumption.
By making use of (182) and (183), we make the comparison between the size of initial
change of φ and the size of its long-run change:
dφ(0)
dgj
− dφ˜
dgj
= −u˜c
{
ω23 [σ (1− γ) + µ1]− ω13 [σ (1− γ) + µ2]
σ
(
ω23 − ω13
) } ds˜
dgj
< 0, i = d, f. (184)
According to (184), following a fiscal expansion, instantaneous welfare falls initially by a larger
amount than in the long-run. This is due to the fact that the habit stock is initially predeter-
mined and does not change at time t = 0.
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Along the transitional path, φ rises towards its new long-run level:
φ˙(t) = µ1∆1
A1
dgj
dgjeµ1t + µ2∆2
A2
dgj
dgjeµ2t > 0, i = d, f, (185)
where we took the time derivative of the the stable solution for φ(t) (given by (181)). The
sign follows from the fact that ∆1 < 0 and ∆2 > 0. From (185), along the stable adjustment,
instantaneous welfare rises towards its new lower long-run level.
According to (184), whatever the size of the weight γ attached to the reference stock, s, the
short-run response of φ overshoots its new steady-state value, i. e. φ(0) < φ˜. Since the habit
stock is initially predetermined, s(0) = s0, the initial change of instantaneous welfare is only
driven by the variation of real consumption at time t = 0 which induces welfare losses. Over
time, the positive impact of the gradual fall in the habit stock upon φ more than outweighs
the negative impact of the progressive decrease in c. This effect in reflected by the first term
on the right-hand side of (185). As we have shown previously (in section D.4), there exists a
time at which the real consumption together with the consumption experience start increasing.
Reflected by the second term on the right-hand side of (185), this adjustment has a positive
impact on instantaneous welfare.
E.2 Overall Welfare Effects
Until now, we have analyzed the instantaneous welfare implications of an unanticipated perma-
nent fiscal expansion, say at different points of times. To address welfare effects in a convenient
way within an intertemporal-maximizing framework, we have to evaluate the discounted value
of (173) over the agent’s infinite planning horizon. We will see that the sluggish adjustment in
welfare that arises from consumption inertia enters in sharp contrast with the immediate jump
of welfare prevailing with time separable preferences.
In order to have a correct and comprehensive measure of welfare, we calculate first the
discounted value of instantaneous welfare over the entire planning horizon
U =
u˜
δ
+
[
u˜c
(σ+µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ1 A1 +
[
u˜c
(σ+µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ2 A2. (186)
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The first term on the right hand-side of (186) represents the capitalized value of instantaneous
welfare evaluated at the steady-state. The second and the third term on the right hand-side of
(186) vanish whenever preferences are time separable.
In order to derive the overall (des)accumulated welfare following an unanticipated perma-
nent increase of government expenditure, we differentiate (178) w.r.t gj :
dU
dgj
=
u˜c + u˜s
r?
ds˜
dgj
− ω
2
3
ω23 − ω13
[
u˜c
(σ+µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
(r? − µ1)
ds˜
dgj
+
ω13
ω23 − ω13
[
u˜c
(σ+µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
(r? − µ2)
ds˜
dgj
=
[
µ2µ4ω
1
3 − µ1µ3ω23
r?µ3µ4
(
ω23 − ω13
)] [(1 + δ
σ
)
u˜c + u˜s
]
ds˜
dgj
< 0, (187)
where we have evaluated the following expression to determine the sign of (187)
µ2µ4ω
1
3 − µ1µ3ω23
= −r? (µ1ω23 − µ2ω13)+ µ1µ2 (ω23 − ω13)
=
Icµ1µ2 (µ1 − µ2) {(σ + µ1) [µ3µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]− µ3 [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]}
σ [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk] [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
, (188)
=
(+)
(+)
> 0,
where we have substituted expressions (46) and (146b) to determine (188). From (187), a
permanent rise in government spending, gj , leads to a reduction of total welfare.
The long-term change in total welfare is equal to
dU˜
dgj
=
u˜c + u˜s
δ
ds˜
dgj
< 0, (189)
where δ = r? and u˜c + u˜s > 0 according to assumption [H3] described in section 2.
We turn now to the computation of the two-dimensional stable solution for total welfare.
At some date t, total welfare is given by
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
φ(t)e−δ(ν−t)dν (190)
Substituting the solution for φ(t) and integrating, we get
U(t)− U˜ =
[
u˜c
(σ+µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ1 A1e
µ1t +
[
u˜c
(σ+µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ2 A2e
µ2t, (191)
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where we used the fact that U˜ = u˜/δ. Differentiate (191) w. r. t. to time t, total welfare evolves
as follows along the stable trajectory after an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion:
U˙(t) = µ1
[
u˜c
(σ+µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ1
A1
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
dgjeµ1t +
[
u˜c
(σ+µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
δ − µ2
A2
dgj︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
dgjeµ2t > 0, (192)
where A1/dgj > 0 and A2/dgj < 0 are given by (75),
[
u˜c
(σ+µ1
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
< 0 and[
u˜c
(σ+µ2
σ
)
+ u˜s
]
> 0 are given by (177). From (187), (189) and (192), overall welfare falls
abruptly at time t = 0, then rises towards its new lower long-run level, U˜ .
F Savings
Formal Solution for the Stock of Financial Wealth
Financial wealth measured in terms of the domestic good, p(t)a(t), is equal to the sum
of the stock of foreign assets measured in terms of the foreign good, p(t)b(t), and the capital
stock. The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = a˙(t)) is given by:
p(t)a˙(t) = r?p(t)a(t) + w − pc (p(t)) c− Z, (193)
with Z = gD + pgf . Linearize (193) in the neighborhood of the steady-state:
p˜a˙(t) = r?p˜ (a(t)− a˜)− pc (c(t)− c˜)−
(
w − c˜D − gD)
p˜
(p(t)− p˜) ,
= r?p˜ (a(t)− a˜)− pc (c(t)− c˜) +
(
r?a˜− c˜F + gF ) (p(t)− p˜) , (194)
where w ≡ F (k)− Fk (k) and
(
w − c˜D − gD) = p˜ (c˜F + gF − r?a˜).
Inserting the stable solutions for (p(t)− p˜) and (c(t)− c˜) given respectively by (27d) and
(27b), the solution for the current account writes as follows :
p˜a˙(t) = r?p˜ (a(t)− a˜) + Υ˜
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
4e
µit − pc
2∑
i=1
Aiω
i
2e
µit. (195)
where we set Υ˜ =
(
r?a˜− c˜F + gF ).
Solving the differential equation leads to:
a(t)− a˜ =
[
(a0 − a˜)− S1A1
µ1 − r? −
S2A2
µ2 − r?
]
er
?t +
S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t, (196)
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where
S1 =
1
p˜
{
Υ˜ω14 − pcω12 − Fkkk˜ω13
}
, S2 =
1
p˜
{
Υ˜ω24 − pcω22 − Fkkk˜ω23
}
. (197)
Dynamics of savings is the result of conflictory forces such that the signs of S1 and S2 remain
undetermined. Over a first phase, the three effects play in the same direction and induce a
decumulation of financial wealth. First, as longer as Υ˜ is positive, the real exchange rate de-
preciation lowers financial wealth by reducing the real wage. Second, as longer as consumption
remains higher than its steady-state level, this consumption behavior impinges negatively on
savings. Third, a transitorily lower capital stock raised the marginal production of physical
capital and reduces the wage. At some date, real consumption equalizes its steady-state value
from above. This overshooting behavior impinges positively on savings and may eventually
more than outweighs the two other effects such that households accumulate financial wealth.
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, we obtain the linearized
version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
a0 − a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? +
S2A2
µ2 − r? . (198)
For the national intertemporal solvency to hold, the terms in brackets of equation (196) must
be null, so the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to
a(t)− a˜ = S1A1
µ1 − r? e
µ1t +
S2A2
µ2 − r? e
µ2t. (199)
G Functional Forms: Some Analytical Expressions
G.1 Functional Forms and the Steady-State
Consumption-Side
The utility function is of the CRRA form:
u (c, s) =
1
1− ²
( c
sγ
)1−²
, (200)
where the parameter ² corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the parameter
γ indexes the importance of habit formation in the instantaneous utility function.
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First and second partial derivatives of the instantaneous utility function are as follows:
uc = c−²s−γ(1−²) > 0, (201a)
us = −γc1−²s−[γ(1−²)+1] < 0, (201b)
ucc = −²c−(1+²)s−γ(1−²) < 0, (201c)
uss = γ [γ (1− ²) + 1] c1−²s−[γ(1−²)+2] < 0 if and only if ² > 1 + γ
γ
, (201d)
ucs = −γ (1− ²) c−²s−[γ(1−²)+1] > 0 if and only if ² > 1. (201e)
We give some useful expressions using the functional form: (200):
u˜c +
σ
δ + σ
u˜s = c˜−[²+γ(1−²)]
δ + σ (1− γ)
δ + σ
> 0, (202a)
σ (δ + σ)
u˜11
[
u˜11 +
δ + 2σ
δ + σ
Γ˜
]
=
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [δ + σ (1− γ)] > 0, (202b)
−
[
u˜c + σδ+σ u˜s
]
[
u˜11 + δ+2σδ+σ Γ˜
]
c˜
= 1/ [γ + ² (1− γ)] , (202c)
− pcλ¯
p˜u˜11c˜
= − u˜c +
σ
δ+σ u˜s
u˜11c˜
=
[δ + σ (1− γ)]
² (δ + σ)
> 0, (202d)
−σ (δ + 2σ)
u˜11
Γ˜ =
σγ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [δ + σ (1− γ)]} > 0. (202e)
where a tilde indicates that the instantaneous utility is evaluated at the steady state, c˜ = s˜,
and Γ is defined by (??).
We assume that the representative household maximizes a CES function given by:
c (., .) =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cD
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cF )φ−1φ ] φφ−1 (203)
with φ > 0 the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of domestic and
foreign goods, given total expenditure measured in terms of traded goods:
E ≡ cD + pcf . (204)
At the first stage, the household minimizes the cost, E(t) = cD(t) + p(t)cF (t), for a given level
of subutility, c(t), where p(t) is the relative price of the foreign good or the real exchange rate.
For any chosen c(t), the optimal basket (cD(t), cF (t)) is a solution to:
pc (p(t)) c(t) = min{cD(t),cF (t)}
{
cD(t) + p(t)cF (t)(t) : c
(
cD(t), cF (t)
) ≥ c(t)} . (205)
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The subutility function c (.) is linear homogeneous implies that the total expense in consump-
tion goods can be expressed as E(t) = pc (p(t)) c(t), with pc (p(t)) is the unit cost function
dual (or consumption-based price index) to c. The unit cost dual function, pc (.), is defined as
the minimum total expense in consumption goods, E, such that c = c
(
cD(t), cF (t)
)
= 1, for a
given level of the real exchange rate, p. Its expression is given by
pc =
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ
] 1
1−φ
. (206)
The minimized unit cost function depends on the real exchange rate and is expressed in terms
of the domestic good. It has the following properties:
p′c = (1− ϕ) p−φ
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)p1−φ
] φ
1−φ
> 0, (207a)
p′′c = φ (1− ϕ) p−(1+φ)
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ
] φ
1−φ
[
(1− ϕ) e1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ − 1
]
< 0, (207b)
= φp′cp
−1
[
(1− ϕ) e1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ − 1
]
.
Intra-temporal allocations between non tradable goods and tradable goods follow from Shep-
pard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem) applied to (205):
cF = p′cc, and
pcf
pcc
= αc, (208a)
cD =
[
pc − pp′c
]
c, and
cD
pcc
= (1− αc) , (208b)
with the shares of the foreign and the domestic goods in consumption expenditure are given
respectively by
αc =
(1− ϕ) p1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ , , (209a)
1− αc = ϕ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p1−φ . (209b)
By combining equations (207b) and (210), we can rewrite the term −p′′cp/p′c as follows:
−p
′′
cp
p′c
> 0, (210)
where φ (1− αc) represents the elasticity of consumption in the foreign good with respect to
the real exchange rate.
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Production-Side
We assume that the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Y = f (k) = kαK , (211)
where αK corresponds to the capital share.
Export Function
As in Turnovsky and Sen [?], the country may be able to influence the real exchange rate.
This influence is captured by an export function, X (p) which takes a power form:
X = X (p) = γXpνX , (212)
where γX > 0 is a constant and νX represents the price elasticity of the home country’s export.
Note that in the limiting case, of a perfectly elastic export demand function, i. e. νX = +∞,
the real exchange rate is equal to unity.
By making use of the functional form for the export function (212), we can rewrite the
partial derivative of the investment function with respect to the real exchange rate:
Ip = −
(
Xp − pp′′c c
)
,
= − [νX (X/p) + φ (1− αc) cF ] < 0, (213)
where we made use of (210).
Finally, we evaluate at the steady-state the net export reaction function with respect to the
real exchange rate (given by (38)) by substituting the functional form for the export function
(eq (212)):
Ω˜ ≡ −1
p˜
[
Ip +
X˜
p˜
]
=
X˜
p˜2
[
νX + φ (1− αc) p˜c˜
F
X˜
− 1
]
> 0. (214)
Steady-State
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The steady-state (10) can be rewritten as follows:
c˜ =
[(
δ + σ
δ + σ (1− γ)
)
pcλ¯
p˜
]− 1
γ+²(1−γ)
, (215a)
c˜ = s˜, (215b)
k˜ =
(αK
r?
) 1
1−αK , (215c)
k˜αK = (1− αc) pc (p˜) c˜+X0 (p˜)νX + gD, (215d)
b˜ = −
[
k˜αK − pc (p˜) c˜− gD − p˜gF
p˜r?
]
, (215e)
b˜− Φ1k˜ − Φ2s˜ = b0 − Φ1k0 − Φ2s0. (215f)
By using the functional form (200) for preferences, the short-run static condition (??)
determines the steady-state value of real consumption as we can see from (215a) which indicates
that c˜ depends on the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and the real exchange
rate. From (215b), the reference stock must coincide with the real consumption in the long-
run. The equality between the marginal product of physical capital and the world interest rate
allows to determine the long-term level of k. To obtain expression (215c) of the steady-state
value of the capital stock, we made use of the functional form for production given by (211).
Equation (224) corresponds to the steady-state value of the real exchange rate which
is determined by the means of the market-clearing condition (10b) together with the pro-
duction function (211) and export function (212). Consumption of the domestic good,
c˜D = (1− αc) pc (p˜) c˜ is obtained by combining (209b), (206) and (215a). Expression (215d)
shows that the long-term value of the real exchange rate depends on the steady-state values of
the physical capital stock and the real consumption given respectively by (215c) and (215a).
The current account equilibrium in the long-run allows for determining the stock of traded
bonds given by (215e) as a function of: the steady-state endogenous values like the real con-
sumption, c˜, the real exchange rate, p˜ and the capital stock k˜ on the one hand, and on the
other hand the exogenous variables like government spending on the domestic good, gD and
the foreign good, gF , and the world interest rate, r?.
Independently from the linearized version of the intertemporal solvency condition (215f),
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the system of equations (215a) and (215e) can be solved for λ¯ and the government policy
parameters, gD and gF . Substituting the steady-state values of the stock of habits, i. e. s˜ =
c˜ = m
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
, and the long-term value of the stock of international assets, i. e. b˜ =
b
(
λ¯, gD, gF
)
into the solvency condition (215f), we are able to determine the equilibrium value
of the marginal utility of wealth such that (215f) holds.
Furthermore, the steady-state values of consumption in the domestic good and the foreign
good can be written as follows:
c˜D = (1− αc) pcc˜ = ϕ
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p˜1−φ
] φ
1−φ
c˜, (216a)
c˜F =
αcpcc˜
p˜
= (1− ϕ) p˜−φ
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ) p˜1−φ
] φ
1−φ
c˜. (216b)
G.2 Eigenvectors and Real Eigenvalues
The Linearized Matrix
Making use of functional forms described in section G.1, the linearized matrix (15) can be
rewritten as follows:
J ≡

−σ σ 0 0
a21 δ + σ a23 a24
0 − (1− αc) pc r? a34
0 0 p˜Fkk 0

, (217)
with
a21 = −γ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [δ + σ (1− γ)]} , < 0, (218a)
a23 =
[δ + σ (1− γ)]
² (δ + σ)
c˜DFkk
pc
> 0, (218b)
a24 = − [δ + σ (1− γ)]
²
(1− αc) c˜
p˜
< 0. (218c)
a34 = −1
p˜
[
νXX˜ + φ (1− αc) p˜c˜F
]
< 0. (218d)
Determinant and Condition for Real Roots
The determinant J of the matrix of the linearized system denoted by b4 (given by (19d))
can be rewritten as by making use of the functional forms for the production function, the
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export function, and real consumptio aggregator function:
Det J = b4 =
σ
²
[δ + σ (1− γ)]Fkk
{
[γ + ² (1− γ)] Ipp˜− (1− αc) c˜D
}
> 0, (219)
where we have substituted (202b), (202d), and used the fact that Ic = − (1− αc) pc and
c˜D = (1− αc) pcc˜. Performing a similar procedure, we can evaluate the term b3/r? (given by
(19c)):
b3
r?
=
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [δ + σ (1− γ)] + Fkk
[
p˜Ip − (1− αc) c˜D [δ + σ (1− γ)]
² (δ + σ)
]
> 0.(220)
and the condition (26) for real roots:
(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4 =
{
σ
²
[γ + ² (1− γ)] [δ + σ (1− γ)]− Fkk
[
p˜Ip − (1− αc) c˜D [δ + σ (1− γ)]
² (δ + σ)
]}2
+ 4
σγ
²
{σ²− (1− ²) [δ + σ (1− γ)]} [δ + σ (1− γ)]
² (δ + σ)
Fkk (1− αc) c˜D ≷ 0, (221)
with Ip given by equation (213) and Fkk evaluated at the steady-state can be written as follows:
Fkk = −r
? (1− αK)
k˜
.
Eigenvalues
We write out the two stable and the two unstable eigenvalues:
µ1 ≡ 12
r? −
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
+
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 < 0, (222a)
µ2 ≡ 12
r? −
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
−
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 < 0, (222b)
µ3 ≡ 12
r? +
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
−
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 > 0, (222c)
µ4 ≡ 12
r? +
√√√√√(r?)2 + 2
 b3
r?
+
√(
b3
r?
)2
− 4b4

 > 0, (222d)
where b3/r?, (b3/r?)
2 − 4b4 are given by (220) and (221) respectively.
If preferences are time separable, the smallest eigenvalue and the highest eigenvalue simplify
as follows:
µγ=01 = −σ < 0, µγ=04 = r? + σ > 0. (223)
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Eigenvectors
Eigenvector ωi2 writes as follows:
ω12 =
(
σ + µ1
σ
)
> 0, (224a)
ω22 =
(
σ + µ2
σ
)
> 0, (224b)
Eigenvector ωi3 writes as follows:
ω13 =
(1− αc) pc (σ + µ1)µ1
σ [µ1µ4 + Ipp˜Fkk]
> 0, (225a)
ω23 =
(1− αc) pc (σ + µ2)µ2
σ [µ2µ3 + Ipp˜Fkk]
> 0, (225b)
Eigenvector ωi4 writes as follows:
ω14 =
p˜Fkk
µ1
ω31 > 0, (226a)
ω24 =
p˜Fkk
µ2
ω32 > 0, (226b)
where the signs of ω12, ω
2
2, ω
2
3 and ω
2
4 stem from the following condition that we imposed:
Ipp˜Fkk < σ (σ + δ) ,
with δ = r?.
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